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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRUG
TESTING AT THE BAIL STAGE*
CATHRYN JO ROSEN** & JOHN S. GOLDKAMP***
I. INTRODUCTION: THE Focus ON DRUG ABUSE AS A PREDICTOR
OF DEFENDANT CRIME
During the 1980's public controversy and policy debate sur-
rounding the problems of importation of illicit drugs and of their
widespread use within the United States have given the "drugs is-
sue" a high priority on both domestic and foreign policy agendas.
Among the diverse social problems being linked to abuse of con-
trolled substances is the idea that a great deal of crime-at least in
the major urban centers-is closely tied to drug abuse. This issue
has received renewed attention, particularly by the Reagan adminis-
tration and more recently, the Bush administration, but also by Con-
gress. Recent government research reports, for example, have
pointed to a role for drug abuse in the development of "criminal
careers"'1 and in arguments supporting policies of selective incapaci-
tation at the sentencing stage in the criminal justice process.
2
Against a background of general findings from criminological litera-
* This research was supported in part by grant number 87-IJ-CX-0007 from the
National Institute ofJustice, United States Department ofJustice, to Temple University,
Department of Criminal Justice. The opinions expressed are the authors' own and do
not necessarily represent the views of the funding agency or of Temple University. The
authors wish to thankJay Carver, Director, District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency
for his valuable comments and Donna Richardson and Richard Presser for their
assistance during the research.
While this article was going to press, the Supreme Court decidedJenkins v. Jones, 109
S. Ct. 1633 (1989) and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989).
** Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Temple University. L.L.M., Temple Uni-
versity School of Law, 1987; J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1978; B.A., Case
Western Reserve University, 1974.
*** Professor of Criminal Justice, Temple University. Ph.D., School of Criminal Jus-
tice, State University of New York at Albany, 1977; M.A., School of Criminal Justice,
State University of New York, 1975; B.A. Wesleyan University, 1969.
1 See 1 & 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, J.
Roth, & C. Visher eds. 1986)[hereinafter "CRIMINAL CAREERS"].
2 See P. GREENWOOD &, A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982).
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ture showing associations between drug use and delinquency, 3 re-
cent, preliminary research has hypothesized that because large
proportions of arrestees test positively for drugs as they enter the
criminal process, evidence of drug use ought to be considered a sig-
nificant predictor of crime.
4
As the heightened concerns about crime in the United States
during the 1970s were transformed into concerns about drugs and
crime in the 1980s, drug testing technology which had been estab-
lishing a track record in military applications became available for
private industry and was suggested as a potentially useful tool in the
criminal justice setting. The availability of rapidly evolving drug
testing technology in the last several years from major manufactur-
ers-such as Roche, Syva, and Abbott-has offered the possibility of
what proponents perceive as a dramatic new direction in the cam-
paign against drug abuse.
The adoption of drug testing programs in private industry as
well as in other areas, such as in public schools to identify students
who are using drugs, in the military to identify and deter drug use
among its personnel, and in prisons and jails to detect and deter
drug use among prisoners and employees, has, of course, been the
source of considerable debate and controversy.5 Critical commen-
tary concerning the use of drug testing programs has been devel-
oped primarily in response to applications by private industry and
government regulated businesses. The arguments for the use of
drug testing by private employers have focused on concerns for em-
ployee productivity and, in a number of occupations, concerns that
3 See R. GANDOSSY, J. WILLIAMS, J. COHEN, & H. HARWOOD, DRUGS AND CRIME: A
SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE (1980)[hereinafter R. GANDOSSY].
4 See M. Toborg, A. Yezer &J. Bellassai, Analysis of Drug Use Among Arrestees, Mono-
graph 4 (Assessment of Pretrial Urine Testing in the District of Columbia), Washington,
D.C.: Toborg Associates, 1987 (unpublished report); A. Yezer, R. Trost, M. ToborgJ.
Bellassai & C. Quintos, Periodic Urine Testing as a Signalling Device for Pretrial Release, Mono-
graph 5 (Assessment of Pretrial Urine Testing in the District of Columbia), Washington,
D.C.: Toborg Associates, 1987 (unpublished report); A. Yezer, R. Trost & M. Toborg,
The Efficiency of Using Urine Test Results in Risk Classification of Arrestees, Monograph 6 (As-
sessment of Pretrial Urine Testing in the District of Columbia), Washington, D.C.:
Toborg Associates, 1987 (unpublished report); E. WISH, DRUG USE FORECASTING: NEW
YORK, 1984 TO 1986 (U.S. Department ofJustice, National Institute ofJustice, February,
1987).
5 See generally infra notes 132-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of govern-
ment interests in employee testing. An extensive literature has developed over the past
few years debating the pros and cons of workplace drug testing. While proponents of
employee urinalysis generally cite the benefits described in the text, opponents argue,
inter alia, that because alcohol abuse is much more widespread than drug abuse, univer-
sal drug testing is disproportionate to the scope of the problem and has little functional
value in screening out impaired workers or applicants. See, e.g., Council on Scientific
Affairs, Council Report: Issues in Employee Drug Testing, 258 J.A.M.A. 2089 (1987).
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drug impaired behavior may present hazards to other employees
and to the public. Thus, for example, employers have used pre-
employment urinalysis to avoid hiring employees with drug abuse
related problems. Employers have used both random and
mandatory testing programs after the hiring stage to identify drug
abusers and refer them to counseling or terminate them, and to de-
ter employees from using illicit drugs.
Although difficult issues are shared by the application of drug
testing programs in each of these areas-such as questions relating
to individual health, public safety, accuracy of results, due process
and fairness-this Article focuses specifically on the introduction of
drug testing as a routine element of the processing of defendants at
the earliest stages of the criminal process.
Routine urinalysis of arrestees prior to the bail or pretrial re-
lease decision is an innovation with a relatively short history.
Although preceded by occasional uses of drug testing to enforce
conditions of probation and in pretrial diversion, systematic testing
of arrestees prior to bail was pioneered in the District of Columbia
in 1984 with funding from the National Institute of Justice.6
Prompted by preliminary findings from research in New York City
and in the District of Columbia pointing to a relationship between
positive drug test results and new arrests, 7 the District of Columbia
Pretrial Services Agency implemented a model program of testing
designed to inform judges concerning defendants' drug abuse and
to monitor the behavior of defendants granted conditional nonfi-
nancial release before trial. Under the D.C. program, arrestees test-
ing positively are required, as a condition of release, to report for
further urinalysis and perhaps for referral to drug counseling. Fail-
ure to comply with the monitoring and reporting conditions of re-
lease assigned by the judge in that jurisdiction can result in the
setting of more restrictive conditions (including increased monitor-
ing), revocation of release, and prosecution for contempt of court.8
The director of the Pretrial Services Agency has described the
underlying rationale for the pilot urinalysis program in the District
of Columbia, reflecting a pragmatic interpretation of research find-
ings relating to the drug-crime link, in the following manner:
6 j. CARVER, DRUGS AND CRIME: CONTROLLING USE AND REDUCING RISK THROUGH
TESTING 2-3 (1986).
7 See, e.g., Toborg & Kirby, Drug Use and Pretrial Crime in the District of Columbia, Re-
search Brief, Nat'l Inst. Just. (1984); Wish &Johnson, The Impact of Substance Abuse on Crimi-
nal Careers, in 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS, supra note 1, at 52.
8 SeeJ. CARVER, supra note 6; D.C. Code Ann. § 23-139 (1981); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
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The theoretical basis for the program is derived from earlier studies
that show, among other things, that drug use is very much a character-
istic of serious and violent offenders. On the other hand, even among
high-risk individuals with established patterns of both drug abuse and
criminality, increasing or reducing the level of drug abuse is associated
with a corresponding increase or reduction in criminality.9
Since implementation of the D.C. program, findings showing a rela-
tionship between positive urinalysis results at the bail stage and sub-
sequent criminality or flight by defendants during pretrial release
have been reported. 10 In addition, one study has reported findings
interpreted as showing that the D.C. program has been successful in
increasing the likelihood of appearance for court dates and in de-
creasing the rate of further crime among those released."
The experience with the District of Columbia's testing program
and these findings have stirred interest in the wider scale establish-
ment of arrestee drug testing programs. The Bureau of Justice
Assistance, for example, has recently provided funding to test the
applicability of the D.C. testing program to other jurisdictions, in-
cluding Tucson, Phoenix, Milwaukee, Portland, Wilmington, and
Prince George's County, Maryland. 12 In addition, the National In-
stitute of Justice has funded the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) pro-
9 J. CARVER, supra note 6, at 2-3.
10 See supra, note 4 (series of unpublished monographs describing research evaluat-
ing the drug testing program in Washington, D.C., by Toborg and Associates (1987),
which report that, above and beyond the power of other kinds of information to predict
the likelihood of flight and crime during pretrial release, knowledge of positive drug test
results serves as an important measure of defendant risk, and that drug testing itself can
be employed effectively as a condition of pretrial release to reduce crime and flight). But
see BELENKO & MARA-DRrrA, DRUG USE AND PRETRIAL MISCONDUCT: THE UTILITY OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT DRUG TESTS AS A PREDICTOR OF FAILURE-TO-APPEAR (New York Criminal
Justice Agency, February, 1988) (preliminary report) (describing similar research in New
York and reporting that knowledge of drug test results contributes little to a judge's
ability to predict defendant flight). See also Goldkamp, Gottfredson, & Weiland, The Util-
ity of Drug Testing in the Assessment of Defendant Risk at the Pretrial Release Decision, Temple
University (1988) (unpublished report) (where such a relationship was not found).
11 See BELENKO & MARA-DRrrA, supra note 10 (a study of New York City defendants
that did not find that knowledge of drug test results adds to the ability of judges to
predict a failure to appear beyond the information generally available at the bail stage).
12 See Pretrial Drug Testing in Six Jurisdictions, 12 PRETRIAL Rpm., i-iv (1988) [hereinafter
Pretrial Drug Testing]. The United States Department ofJustice's endorsement of drug
testing at the arrest stage certainly appears grounded on this belief. See, e.g.,J. STEWART,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OFJUSTICE RESEARCH, PROGRAM PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 1988 (Nov. 17,
1987):
Now, we no longer need to watch helplessly as drug spawned crime vitiates entire
neighborhoods. We can do something .... Mandatory, court supervised drug
testing represents an objective test for identifying these high risk offenders. With
this scientifically accurate, impartial data, judges are in a position to decide appro-
priate conditions for pretrial release, including periodic testing which research
shows lowers the demand for drugs.
1989]
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gram to test arrestees anonymously on a quarterly basis in principal
American cities to chart the kinds of drugs being used among arres-
tee populations based on its hypothesis that information about drug
abuse obtained through urinalysis is an important and-because it is
scientific-superior instrument for identifying "the high risk of-
fender" and minimizing the risk posed by defendants during pretrial
release.' 3 The Arizona legislature enacted a law in 1987 authorizing
mandatory drug testing of felony arrestees beginning in 1988 for
the purpose of informing the pretrial release decision. 
14
To date, urinalysis of arrestees has been used solely to inform
the decision regarding conditions of pretrial release - particularly
whether to require further periodic drug testing during the pretrial
period. The potential importance of drug testing at the pre-bail
stage for the purpose of "identifying the high rate offender," that is,
for purposes of community safety, takes on added significance since
enactment of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 198415-the federal
preventive detention law aimed at the identification and incapacita-
tion of a "small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous de-
fendants."' 16 That law, like the District of Columbia law enacted in
1970 and other state laws, ' 7 emphasized the drug-crime relationship
in its designation of factors to be considered by judges in establish-
ing conditions of release,' 8 in its inclusion of drug-related offenses
among the criteria qualifying defendants for detention hearings on
the basis of potential dangerousness, 19 and in its provision for ex-
amination of temporarily held defendants to determine whether
they are "addicts."
20
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
13 See E. Wish, supra note 4.
14 See PADD Enabling Legislation, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3967-68 (1987).
15 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1982).
16 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1983).
17 See Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 59-64 (1985).
18 The relevant section, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1982), entitled "Factors to Be Consid-
ered," urges judicial consideration of drug related concerns in two provisions: first, in
considering the "nature and circumstances of the offense . . . including whether the
offense... involves a narcotic drug"; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1), and second, in considering
the "history and characteristics" of the defendant, including "his ... history relating to
drug or alcohol abuse." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A).
19 Id. at § 3142(1)(c). This provision outlines as one of the eligibility criteria for pre-
trial detention proceedings charged offenses "for which a maximum term of imprison-
ment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 801, the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. § 951, or section 1
of the Act of September 15, 1980, 21 U.S.C. § 955."
20 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(2).
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United States v. Salerno,21 upholding the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1984, also makes questions about the introduction of drug testing
into the bail process more critical in two ways. First, the Supreme
Court's decision in Salerno, appears to have finally silenced the long-
standing controversy about the appropriateness of public safety
goals in the bail/pretrial release process. Salerno held that the pre-
ventive detention provisions of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984
do not violate the eighth or fourteenth amendments. 22 The Act au-
thorizes pretrial detention of persons charged with federal crimes
when the court determines that the defendant poses a threat to com-
munity safety that cannot be neutralized by imposing any set of con-
ditions on pretrial release. The Court found the Act to be
constitutional in its substance and procedure. Referring to its ear-
lier decision in Schall v. Martin,23 regarding juvenile pretrial deten-
tion based on anticipation of likely danger to the community, the
Court stated that the "general concern with crime prevention is no
less compelling when suspects are adults."'24 Thus, drug testing at
the pre-bail stage has been proposed chiefly as a means for reducing
the threat to public safety believed to be posed by drug abusing
defendants.
The Salerno decision is important as well because of its position
on standards for prediction at the pretrial release stage. A tradi-
tional argument of opponents to preventive detention has been that
judges are not able to predict the future acts of defendants with suf-
ficient accuracy to warrant adoption of explicit preventive detention
procedures. 25 To the arguments that judges cannot predict suffi-
ciently well the likelihood that defendants will engage in crime in
the future and that pretrial detention on that basis is tantamount to
punishment without due process, the Court responded, as it had in
Schall, that "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a predic-
tion of future criminal conduct" 26 and that once courts perceive that
a defendant poses a "threat" of some danger to the public, they may
"disable the arrestee from executing that threat."
27
As the movement to revise bail and pretrial detention law has
21 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
22 Id.
23 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
24 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749.
25 See, e.g., Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pis I and II), 113 U. PA. L. REV.
959, 1125 (1965); Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23
J. LEGAL EDUC., 24 (1970); Ervin, Forward: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Crimi-
nal Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 290 (1971).




simmered over the last two decades to make community safety an
explicit and legitimate concern,28 so too have questions about how
judges might best identify "dangerous" defendants. The criteria in
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, derived from the District of
Columbia prototype in 1970, defining defendants eligibility for de-
tention represent the assumption of Congress that the defendant's
criminal charge and prior record of convictions, among other fac-
tors, can identify future criminals. 29 Analysis of current pre-trial re-
lease laws has shown that legislatures have suggested many criteria
for judges to consider in making their bail/pretrial release determi-
nations, including aspects of the criminal charges, the defendant's
community ties, prior criminal record, and in a few instances, the
defendant's history of drug abuse.30 Although research has not pro-
duced empirical support that these statutory criteria-or others-
can powerfully predict defendant crime during periods of pretrial
release,3 ' recent research has begun to develop empirical risk classi-
fications that, if used, would at least offer improvements over the
accuracy of judges' subjective assessments.
3 2
Reliance on results of urinalysis to inform important decisions,
such as the determination of conditions of pretrial release or, even
pretrial detention, raises a number of questions similar to those
raised about use of other kinds of information, such as prior crimi-
nal history, for the same purpose.33 In the first place, for its use to
28 See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, Appendix C (A.B.A. Tent.
Draft 1968); A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON CRIME, TASK FORCE REPORT (Criminal Justice Sec-
tion 1981).
29 Of course, the federal law was only the last, not the first, example of laws imple-
menting "danger" classifications; a wide variety of state laws had been enacted in the
previous 15 years employing hosts of danger criteria. See generally Goldkamp, supra note
17.
30 See id.; J. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED 62-69 (1979).
31 See, e.g., Angel, Green, Kaufman, & Van Loon, Preventive Detention: An Empirical
Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1971).
32 See Goldkamp, Prediction in Criminal Justice Policy Development, in PREDICTION AND
CLASSIFICATION (D. Gottfredson & M. Tonry eds. 1987);J. GOLDKAMP & M. GOTrFRED-
SON, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR BAIL: AN ExPERIMENT IN COURT REFORM (1985).
Bail/pretrial release guidelines have been developed and implemented using risk classi-
fications in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Dade County, Florida, and Maricopa County, Ar-
izona. See Goldkamp & Gottfredson, Guidelines for Bail and Pretrial Release, in THREE
URBAN COURTS: VOLUME I - THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAIL/PRETRIAL RELEASE GUIDELINES
IN MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, DADE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT AND BOSTON MU-
NICIPAL COURT (1988) (unpublished report).
33 Although in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Supreme Court
approved pretrial detention based on risk classifications defined by the legislature, in the
absence of empirical support for the accuracy of the predictive tool, further research
remains essential. There is a qualitative difference between prediction based upon in-
formation such as prior convictions or nature of the current charges that is obtained
without implicating any constitutionally protected rights and prediction based upon in-
[Vol. 80
DRUG TESTING AT BAIL STAGE
be rational, there must be an arguable, if not demonstrable, connec-
tion between the predictive information-in this case, drug use-
and crime. Although much literature has reported on this relation-
ship,3 4 there are questions about its interpretation, such as whether
it is causal or spurious.
In the pretrial context, theoretically, the concern is for crime
that might be committed within the limited period of pretrial re-
lease, perhaps averaging no more than ninety days before a case is
adjudicated, although possibly extending considerably longer de-
pending on the court system. However interpreted, the empirical
support of the general relationship between drug use and pretrial
crime is not uniformly strong. In the area of pretrial release, several
studies have suggested a relationship at the bivariate level between
misconduct during pretrial release and activ'e defendant drug
abuse.3 5 Whether the relationship survives the exercise of appropri-
ate statistical controls is not at all assured at this stage of the re-
search and is the source of continued study.
3 6
While acknowledging the centrality of prediction in the bail or
pretrial release decision task, the Supreme Court in Salerno refused
to be bound by statistical notions of error, such as discussion of
false positives and false negatives. Thus, in evaluating the use of
drug testing of defendants at the pretrial release stage, one might
suppose that the Court would not reject its utility merely on statisti-
cal grounds-such as whether or not knowledge of defendants' drug
test results really adds to a judge's statistical ability to predict de-
fendants' criminal proclivities. Rather, the Court might view such
data as relevant and reasonably objective information appropriately
playing a role in the classification of defendants for the purposes of
the release decision.
37
The second way in which the Salerno decision might have a bear-
ing on the acceptance of drug testing is in testing's proposed role as
a constraint on the criminal activities of released defendants. Pro-
ponents of drug testing at the bail stage argue that a program of
drug testing during the release period will reduce the use of drugs
among defendants-and hence their criminal activities. At the very
least, they argue, ongoing testing provides a mechanism for distin-
formation that can only be obtained by intruding upon constitutionally protected rights
of privacy.
34 See generally R. GANDOSSY, supra note 3.
35 See Toborg & Kirby, supra note .
36 Recent studies questioning the strength of this relationship include supra note 10,
and Goldkamp, Gottfredson, & Weiland, supra note 10.
37 See generally Morris & Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1985).
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guishing individuals who are willing and able to comply with court-
ordered conditions of release from those who are not, before those
individuals fail to appear for trial. 38 Provided that the Court would
accept the reasoning that evidence of drug abuse (via drug test re-
sults) is an indicator of criminality, it may well view conditional re-
lease type drug monitoring programs as appropriately "disabling
the defendant from executing the threat" of criminality detected by
testing in the first place.
39
Drug testing after an intitial appearance is also offered by pro-
ponents as a means of securing the release before trial of defendants
who would otherwise remain detained. That is, testing would be a
condition of pretrial release intended as an "alternative to incarcer-
ation." 40 This rationale-that monitoring the urine of released de-
fendants would serve as a "less restrictive" bail option than
detention-is proposed independently of its empirical grounding.
The advent of drug testing at the bail stage of the criminal pro-
cess raises important legal and ethical considerations that extend
beyond those considered by the Court in Salerno.4 1 These kinds of
questions-as well as the practical questions concerning predictive
power-will ultimately affect how society will view use of urinalysis
test results as an informational tool in bail decisionmaking and how
the criminal justice system will be able to employ this technology.
This Article begins to address these ethical/legal questions by ex-
ploring pressing threshold issues regarding the constitutionality of
the actual process of conducting urinalysis on all arrestees prior to
their first appearance. 42 Regardless of the predictive power of
urinalysis, if mandatory bail stage testing unduly intrudes upon the
38 See, e.g., J. CARVER, supra note 6; J. STEWART, supra note 12; Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
39 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
40 See Pretrial Drug Testing, supra note 12.
41 As is demonstrated infra, the legal questions cannot be completely divorced from
the empirical ones. In Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded with directions to
the district court to make findings of fact regarding empirical support for the assertion
that positive urinalysis is positively correlated to successful performance on pretrial
release.
42 Bail stage urinalysis raises other legal issues that we have yet to explore as fully as
the fifth, fourth, and fourteenth amendment issues related to the legitimacy of such test-
ing. There are a number of very practical legal concerns that are best addressed in the
context of the law of particular jurisdictions. Arrestee urinalysis is futile if the informa-
tion cannot be used at the bail stage. Bail laws in the jurisdiction must be investigated to
determine whether drug use is a permissible consideration in the pretrial release deci-
sion and whether drug testing conditions may be imposed on pretrial release. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1982); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 (1981 & Supp. 1988). If not, devel-
122 [Vol. 80
DRUG TESTING AT BAIL STAGE
constitutional rights of criminal defendants, it is unlikely to survive
opment of a drug testing program must be preceded by appropriate legislative action.
See, e.g., PADD Enabling Legislation, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3967-68 (1987).
Even if there is appropriate legislation, imposition of testing conditions on pretrial
release may be challenged as implicating the liberty interest protected by the due pro-
cess clause. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530 (1979)(due process protects liberty inter-
ests of persons accused of crime). It is unlikely, however, that this argument will prevail
because the primary purpose for urine testing is regulatory rather than punitive. Conse-
quently, due process requires only that urinalysis conditions be reasonably related to the
legitimate government interest in preventing non-appearance and protecting commu-
nity safety. Id. at 539. The rationality of the relationship cannot be disputed under this
deferential standard. However, closer scrutiny of the government's goals and the
means-end relationship is required under the fourth amendment. See id. at 559-60; infra
notes 185-190 and accompanying text.
Other issues relate to the use of urinalysis results in judicial decisionmaking. At the
trial stage (and in other judicial proceedings), in order for the test result to be intro-
duced into evidence, the urinalysis technique must be recognized as a legitimate scien-
tific test in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, No. 86-31, slip op. at 24
(D.C. Ct. of App. Sept. 9, 1988)(double EMIT test presumptively reliable and, therefore,
generally admissible in D.C. courts). In addition, chain of custody requirements must be
met in order to assure that the test results reveal the urine contents of the proper indi-
vidual. Because reports of test results are hearsay, special procedures may be necessary
in order to introduce the evidence if the hearsay rule applies to bail and bail revocation
hearings in the jurisdiction. See Id. at 7 n.3 (holding D.C. Pretrial Services urine test
results admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule). Rules, if
they exist, regarding the burden of proof at bail and bail revocation hearings are also
very important. See generally Goldkamp, supra note 17, at 33-38 and Table 9. Questions
concerning accuracy of certain testing techniques in identifying drug users and the relia-
bility of the results become more significant as the burden of proof increases. Finally,
the extent of the accused's right to rebut evidence at bail and bail revocation hearings is
particularly important in light of the potential for false positives.
Many of these evidentiary questions loom larger at the stage in which the govern-
ment seeks to rescind pretrial release or convict the defendant of criminal contempt
because of failure to comply with regular testing conditions than they do at the bail
hearing itself where the evidentiary standards may not be as rigorous. See United States
v. Roy, 14 Daily Washington L. Rptr. 2481, 2491 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986)(positive EMIT
test alone is insufficient to show drugs used in violation of condition of pretrial release
beyond a reasonable doubt). Failure of jurisdictions to meet the requisite evidentiary
standards at either stage in the operation of their testing programs may amount to a
denial of due process. Cf. Washington Post, Sept. 9, 1988, § C at 1 (reporting on appeal
to D.C. Court of Appeals from lower court decision holding defendant in contempt of
court for failure to comply with the condition of pretrial release requiring periodic clean
urine samples; the issue raised is whether contempt conviction on basis of EMIT test
violates due process).
Similarly, the prospect of increased adoption of pretrial detention and the possibil-
ity that urinalysis test results could be used to help inform that decision place a still
different light on these issues. In Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Court held that pre-
ventive detention was permissible when the procedures under review were followed.
The Bail Reform Act requires that it must be established by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the defendant falls within the statutory risk classifications before release can
be refused. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). To the extent that evidence of drug abuse established
through pre-bail testing is relevant to the outcome of detention hearings, the adequacy
of screening immunoassay technologies to meet this evidentiary standard without other
corroborative evidence is uncertain at best. Cf. Roy, 114 Daily Washington L. Rptr. at
1989]
ROSEN AND GOLDKAMP
very long as a criminal justice innovation. 43 This Article reviews
fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment questions that arise when
drug testing is applied to defendants entering the criminal process
and assesses their likely resolution and impact on the increasing
number of bail stage testing programs.
II. BAIL STAGE URINALYSIS IN OPERATION
Drug testing at the bail stage of the criminal process differs
from drug testing in other settings principally because of the short
period of time between the collection of a urine specimen from the
arrestee and the first judicial stage at which test results are made
available to the court for its deliberation concerning pretrial release.
The short "turnaround" time means, for one thing, that more time-
consuming but more accurate urinalysis procedures cannot be con-
ducted, at least not on a routine basis. As a result, one of the less
costly and quicker screening technologies-such as the EMIT sys-
tem used in the District of Columbia-is used.44 Screening-as op-
posed to confirming-tests are more general in detection capacities
2491 (single positive EMIT test insufficient to prove drug use beyond a reasonable
doubt). Although there is no constitutional right to bail, see Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987),
in the detention decision context, as opposed to the decision to set restrictive conditions
of pretrial release, scrutiny of the testing results might be more demanding given the
weightier defendant interests at stake. This may alter the outcome of fourth amendment
analysis, see generally supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text, and increase procedural
due process requirements.
43 See AFGE v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986). In Weinberger, the
court admonished the government that the end (useful information) does not necessar-
ily justify the means (intrusion on fourth amendment rights):
As a final note on the topic of "reasonableness," the Court addresses the govern-
ment's adamant argument that drug use is "simply incompatible" with federal em-
ployment.., the Court does not take issue with it. The question here, however, is
not whether drug use, off-duty or on-duty is incompatible with federal employment.
Rather, the question is by what means is it permissible to come by evidence of such
drug use. The growing of marijuana in an employee's basement would certainly not
be appropriate, but surely the government cannot be heard to say that a warrantless
search of all civilian employees' basements is permissible in order to find out who is
growing marijuana. Similarly, the random search of civilian employees' urine, a
bodily fluid generally retained for disposal when and where an individual chooses, is
impermissible under any but the most urgent of circumstances. The much-quoted
language of the district court in McDonell v. Hunter puts it best: "There is no doubt
about it-searches and seizures can yield a wealth of information useful to the
searcher. (That is why King George III's men so frequently searched the colonists).
That potential, however, does not make a governmental employer's search of an
employee a constitutionally reasonable one."
Id. at 735-36 (emphasis in original).
44 Goldkamp, Gottfredson, & Weiland, supra note 10, at 21-32. Several screening
technologies are available, including radioimmunoassay (RIA), and enzyme immunoas-
say (EMIT). See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Urine Testingfor Drugs ofAbuse,
in Nat'l Institute on Drug Abuse, Research Monograph 73 (R. Hawks and C. Chiang ed.
1986).
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and provide a less specific, semi-quantitative measure of the amount
of drug metabolites present in urine. Although there is debate
about the exact level of accuracy associated with screening tests, it is
arguably very high.
45
Although professionals in the field generally recommend that
screening test results be repeated (confirmed) on the more accurate
gas chromatography/mass spectometry technology when positive
test results can have serious implications for the person tested (such
as when employment or military service can be terminated),46 this is
seldom practical in the bail stage testing. Rather, screening tests
may be repeated and the urine may be saved for later confirmation,
in the event that the results are contested.
Drug testing for pretrial release determinations differs as well
from other kinds of testing programs in the standard of proof gov-
erning the use of the information. Currently, proponents believe
that results of drug tests can be used just like any other information
pertaining to a defendant's background, including evidence of drug
or alcohol abuse obtained by other methods,47 that would assist the
judge or judicial officer in making the most informed bail/pretrial
release decision. Thus, rather than regarding drug test results in a
fashion similar to evidence to be submitted at the trial stage, at the
bail stage they are viewed in the context of other background infor-
mation. Given the often unreliable nature of background informa-
tion on defendants at this stage of the criminal process, drug test
results are viewed as a much more objective source than the usual
information obtained through interviews with defendants about
their histories of substance abuse.
48
Procedures for conducting testing in the few sites implementing
testing programs are based primarily on the procedures developed
by the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency's pilot model.
49
Once a defendant has been arrested and confined to the lockup in
that city, a pretrial services worker will ask the defendant for a speci-
45 See generally Council on Scientific Affairs, Council Report: Scientific Issues in Drug Test-
ing, 257J. A.M.A. 3110-14 (1987) for a discussion of the relationship between accuracy
and sensitivity.
46 See, e.g., id. at 3113; Blanke, Quality Assurance in Drug Testing, 33 CLINICAL CHEMIS-
TRY 41B (1987); Dep't of Health and Human Services, Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental
Health Administration, Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs,
NIDA, Fed. Reg. 11,970-989 (April 11, 1988).
47 See, e.g., National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, Performance Standards
and Goals for Pretrial Release and Diversion, 15-18 (1978).
48 See J. CARVER, supra note 6; J. STEWART, supra note 12; Pretrial Drug Testing, supra
note 12.
49 For a description of the District of Columbia program, seeJ. CARVER, supra note 6.
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men and explain the purpose of the testing program. The defend-
ant is then asked to sign a waiver form indicating voluntary
compliance. The defendant is required to produce the specimen
under observation by a pretrial services worker in order to assure
authenticity of the specimen and to preserve the chain of custody.
After the full pretrial services interview has been completed and
background information summarized, the test results are noted and
the combined information goes into a pretrial services recommen-
dation for pretrial release. 50
The judge is shown/informed whether or not the defendant
tested positively for a drug of abuse (marijuana is excluded), or
whether the test was refused or not completed for other reasons.
With the test results as well as the more general background infor-
mation, the judge proceeds to determine pretrial release. In the
event that a defendant has not provided a specimen, the judge may
require one as a condition of release.51 Given positive results for a
drug of abuse, the judge may grant pretrial release on the condition
that the defendant participate in a program of urine monitoring.
52
In the District of Columbia, by statute,53 results are to remain
confidential and be used only for determining pretrial release or for
50 See generally J. CARVER, supra note 6; Pretrial Drug Testing, supra note 12.
51 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Berry v. District of Columbia,
833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Some jurisdictions are following this "post-arraign-
ment" procedure in all cases rather than using mass pre-arraignment testing. This effort
to avoid constitutional difficulties may well be futile. First, Berry establishes that post-
arraignment testing implicates fourth amendment rights. Berry, 833 F.2d at 1034. Sec-
ond, to the extent that this approach relies on the argument that because urine testing is
regulatory rather than punitive because it is a permissible condition of pretrial release, it
fails to distinguish between the requirements of substantive due process and the fourth
amendment. It is permissible to impose conditions on pretrial release that implicate
interests protected by the due process clause so long as they are reasonably related to a
non-punitive government interest. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 523, 534, 539 (1979);
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Where fourth amendment rights are
implictated the analysis is different, however, and the government burden is more diffi-
cult requiring, inter alia, consideration of the government interest and clear scrutiny of
the means-end fit. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60 (discussing standard for reviewing pretrial
detainees' claim that body cavity searches violated their fourth amendment rights); Berry,
833 F.2d at 1034-36 (explaining standard to be applied to determine whether post-ar-
raignment testing violates fourth amendment). Thus, even if testing is reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate regulatory purpose, fourth amendment principles may prohibit the
government from conditioning pretrial release on a urine test, regardless of the specific
timing and context, without some factual basis other than arrest on probable cause. See
notes 173-175 and accompanying text. Cf United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)
(upholding pretrial detention as non-violative of due process where, inter alia, danger-
ousness must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
52 See generally J. Carver, supra note 6; Practical Drug Testing, supra note 12.
53 D.C. Code Ann. § 23-1324 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
126 [Vol. 80
DRUG TESTING AT BAIL STAGE
supervising released defendants. 54 Thus, results should not be
shared with the prosecutor or the probation department for other
uses.55 In addition, very careful arrangements had to be devised to
assure continued chain of custody of the urine specimen and its re-
sults (so that appropriate results were attributed to the correct
individuals).
As the District of Columbia program was being set up-and as
new sites consider implementing drug testing programs-many dif-
ficult issues, legal, practical and ethical had to be addressed. Ques-
tions about error rates due to the technologies employed or due to
human error are often raised, for example.56 Questions about the
sufficiency of chain of custody procedures and about re-testing and
appeals have also been discussed.5 7 Currently, research is address-
ing many of these questions and courts are beginning to consider
others.58
This Article begins addressing those issues by considering only
the constitutional issues associated with the process of mandatory
drug testing, because, should such testing programs fail to meet
constitutional standards, other questions regarding the propriety
and procedure for using the information in bail and bail revocation
decisions will be moot. Requiring persons arrested for crime to
produce urine samples prior to the first judicial appearance poten-
tially implicates three constitutional rights: the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination; the right to due process, pro-
tected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments; and the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the fourth
amendment. The self-incrimination and due process questions are
easily answered but the strictures of the fourth amendment raise
much more difficult and interesting questions about the propriety of
bail stage urinalysis. 59
54 Id.
55 But see Jones v. United States, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (positive pre-arraign-
ment drug test admissible at trial for possession of a controlled substance to rebut de-
fendant's testimony that he did not know the substance he picked up from street was
cocaine). Jones is consistent with D.C. CGDE ANN. § 23-303(d) which provides that infor-
mation obtained by the Pretrial Services Agency "shall not be admissible on the issue of
guilt in any judicial proceeding, but such information may be used.., for the purposes
of impeachment in any subsequent proceeding."
56 See, e.g., Goldkamp, Gottfredson, & Weiland, supra note 10, at 21-32.
57 See generally Pretrial Drug Testing, supra note 12.
58 See generally Goldkamp, Gottfredson, & Weiland, supra note 10. See also Jones v.
United States, 833 F.2d at 24 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Roy, 14 Daily Washing-
ton L. Rptr. 2481, 2491 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986).
59 The discussion in the remainder of this Article is narrowly focused on the permis-
sibility of the mandatory urine tests performed on all arrestees held for bailable offenses
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III. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
On first consideration, jurisdictions considering the implemen-
tation of a drug testing program might question whether urine test-
ing of arrestees violates the privilege against self-incrimination
because individuals are required to provide the government with ev-
idence (urine) that they committed a crime (illegal use and posses-
sion of controlled substances). 60 However, the privilege against
self-incrimination protects individuals from being compelled by the
government to give only testimonial or communicative evidence.
6'
Because urine testing involves the observation and analysis of a
physical attribute of a person's body, it is non-testimonial and the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not
applicable. 6
2
Nonetheless, in response to fifth amendment concerns, the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the other jurisdictions implementing drug
testing programs have moved to prevent use of test results by other
agencies, such as the prosecutor's office, for purposes other than the
pretrial release decision. While these assurances are unnecessary to
protect test subjects' privilege against self-incrimination, they are
relevant to the question of the reasonableness of urine testing as a
fourth amendment search and seizure and therefore should not be
discarded.
63
prior to, their first judicial appearance. Similar issues are raised when an order granting
pre-trial release is conditioned upon provision of an initial urine sample despite lack of
individualized suspicion of drug use as in Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1987). See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. Once pretrial release
has been conditioned upon periodic urinalysis because initial test results were positive,
however, the constitutional implications change considerably. Questions under the
fourth, fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments as well as statutory and common law
regarding the propriety of including urine testing as a condition of release and of revok-
ing release or convicting releasees of criminal contempt because of failure to comply
with the condition are not addressed in this Article.
60 W. LaFave &J. Israel, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.10, at 386-87 (1985). In the ab-
sence of legally binding guarantees of immunity, the potential for direct or indirect use
of the information to convict an individual of a crime makes it incriminating. Id. § 8.11,
at 393-98.
61 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 764 (1966).
62 National Treasury Employee's Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 181 (5th Cir.
1987) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322,
1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Hampson v. Satran, 319 N.W.2d 796, 800 (N.D. 1982).
63 See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevance of
the confidentiality of test results to reasonableness of the search procedure under the
fourth amendment. If urine testing did implicate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, mere oral or written promises to limit the use of the information to the bail deci-
sion would not be sufficient to overcome constitutional objections to mandatory testing.
Only a legally binding guarantee of immunity and careful procedures to insure that the
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IV. DUE PROCESS PROHIBITION AGAINST OUTRAGEOUS
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
Among the many substantive and procedural rules imposed on
government by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments is a prohibition against gathering evidence in a manner
that "shocks the conscience."64 At first blush it might appear that
because urine samples usually are provided while the subject is be-
ing observed, urinalysis shocks the conscience. This claim as well as
arguments that techniques of facilitating urination, such as requir-
ing test subjects who have difficulty providing a sample to drink li-
quids, violate due process have been rejected. 65 Nonetheless,
program planners and administrators should be aware of the possi-
bility that extraordinarily unseemly deviations from normal proce-
dure might give rise to due process claims.
V. PROHIBITION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The fourth amendment requires that all searches and seizures
conducted by government agents be reasonable regardless of
whether the fruits of the search will be used to prosecute an individ-
ual for a crime or for any other "non-criminal" government pur-
pose.66 Whether urine samples are obtained by the police, civilian
police department employees, or court agency employees (for ex-
ample, pretrial services or probation department workers), state ac-
tion is involved. The constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures is not diminished by the fact
that the exclusionary remedy may be inapplicable at bail and bail
revocation hearings.67 Therefore, if urinalysis is a search and
seizure, bail stage urinalysis must be constitutionally reasonable in
order to be permissible under the fourth amendment.
evidence was not used directly or indirectly by the prosecutor would be sufficient. See
generally W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 60, § 8.11, at 393-98.
64 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
65 See, e.g., Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1980). In Yanez, the de-
fendant challenged the use of results of a urine test to convict the defendant of posses-
sion of morphine. The court held, over one judge's dissent, that obtaining the urine
sample by threatening to use a catheter did not shock the conscience because the threat
itself was sufficient to induce the defendant to urinate. The court implied that actual use
of a catheter may violate due process. Id.
66 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
67 Cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)(the exclusionary rule is ajudi-
cially created remedy for fourth amendment violations and thus separable from the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents).
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A. URINALYSIS IS A SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The fourth amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
government intrusions into their reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy.68 Virtually every court that has addressed the issue has con-
cluded that urinalysis implicates the right of privacy protected by
the fourth amendment. 69 Underlying these decisions is recognition
that, in contemporary American society, urination is generally con-
sidered to be a private matter. Thus, courts have no difficulty reach-
ing the conclusion that one's objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy is violated when one is forced to urinate while being ob-
served by other persons.
70
68 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring); W.
LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 60, at § 53.2(a). This determination requires a two step
inquiry: (1) whether there was a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) whether there
was an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. The Katz standard has undergone
a subtle transformation in recent years. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987), in which the plurality defined the standard for determining whether fourth
amendment rights were implicated by government activity as "whether the conduct in-
fringed 'an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable,'
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)," and suggested that whether the
government agent conducting the search was a law enforcement official is relevant to the
analysis. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 1498.
69 See, e.g., Lovvorn v. City of Chatanooga, 846 F.2d 539, 1542 (6th Cir. 1988); Penny
v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563, 1565 (6th Cir. 1988); RLEA v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 580
(9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1902 (1989); NFFE v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942
(D.C. Cir. 1987);Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacatedsub nom.
Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1635 (1989); Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (llth
Cir. 1987); Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Spence
v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986); Schaill v. Tippecanoe School Corp., 679 F.
Supp. 833, 850, 855 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727,
730 (N.D. 111. 1988); Transport Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D.C. Pa.),
aft'd, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. SEPTA, 863 F.2d 1110 (1988); Feliciano
v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 586 (N.D. Ohio 1987); PBA v. Washington
Township, 672 F. Supp. 779, 784 (D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency,
663 F. Supp. 1560, 1566 (C.D. Cal. 1987); AFGE v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 447 (D.D.C.
1987); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.NJ. 1986); McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp.
1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Patchogue-Medford Con-
gress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 64, 510 N.E.2d 325, 330, 517
N.Y.S.2d 456, 461 (1987); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 547, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789,
792 (Sup. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 131 A.D.2d 214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1987). Cf. Allen v. City of
Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 488 (D. Ga. 1985)(expresses "some doubt" whether urinal-
ysis is a search but "feels constrained by current law" to hold that it is).
70 See, e.g., Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 543; Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 70 N.Y.2d
at 64, 510 N.E.2d at 330, 517 N.Y.S. at 461; Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 586; Taylor, 669 F.
Supp. at 1435. See infra notes 126-128 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
degree of intrusiveness of the search when urinalysis is observed. In fact, public urina-
tion is widely prohibited and certainly frowned upon. Yet, most urinalysis programs
require that urination be observed in order to assure that the samples are genuine. This
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Unobserved urine testing-which would present chain of cus-
tody and accuracy problems for drug testing programs-is also sub-
ject to fourth amendment protections. 71 A number of courts have
concluded that because individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the personal information that their bodily fluids contain-
urinalysis can reveal, for example, information regarding a test sub-
ject's medical condition and the subject's use of prescription and
over the counter drugs in addition to use of illegal drugs-analysis
of urine also constitutes a search.72 Other courts have reasoned that
requiring an individual to produce urine for inspection in a particu-
lar time, place, and manner is unreasonable because it violates one's
sense of personal dignity.73 In short, the processes of obtaining and
procedure was adopted in the District of Columbia program. Samples are collected
from arrestees while they are in the court house lock-up. Arrestees must urinate in a
position from which the pretrial services employee can observe from outside the lock-
up. Other persons in the lock-up are able to observe the procedure as well.
71 See, e.g., Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 543; Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d at 338, vacated sub
nom. Jenkins v.Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989); Weinberger, 818 F.2d at 942; Schaill, 679 F.
Supp. at 855; Taylor, 669 F. Supp. at 1435; AFGE v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 734
(S.D. Ga. 1986); NFFE y. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 435 (D.D.C. 1988) (lack of visual
observation limits, but does not eliminate, intrusiveness of search). Whether the pro-
cess is observed, however, may affect the degree of intrusiveness courts assign to urinal-
ysis. See infra notes 126-131 and accompanying text. But see Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at
734 (concluding that lack of direct observation does not go "very far toward minimizing
the overall intrusion"); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d at 338, vacated sub nom. Jenkins v.
Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989) (observation increases seriousness of already intrusive
search); PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. at 787, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637
(1989) (observation increases seriousness of already intrusive search).
72 See, e.g., Burnley, 839 F.2d at 580 rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1902 (1989); Washington Township,
672 F. Supp. at 784 cert. denied 109 S. Ct. 1637; Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 586. This
argument hinges on the fact that given current testing techniques, urinalysis may either
directly or indirectly reveal information about medical conditions other than the use of
illegal drugs. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977); "Applicants for D.C. Police
Secretly Tested for Pregnancy," Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1987, at Al, col. 1, cited in
Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 434 n.17 (revealing that pregnancy tests were conducted on
urine samples of women applying for jobs as police officers). If test methods were re-
fined to reveal only whether a person had or had not used drugs, an argument could be
made that because one is not legally entitled to take drugs, there is no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in information revealing drug use. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109 (1984)(testing of a small amount of a white powdery substance seized without
probable cause or a warrant to determine whether it was cocaine was not a search be-
cause there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696 (1983) (sniffing of luggage by drug detecting dog was not a search because
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband). But see Feliciano, 671 F.
Supp. at 586 ("But even if urinalysis were restricted to seeking information about illicit
drug use, it would still invade personal privacy. The fourth amendment requires that
such invasions of privacy be carefully controlled, even though the government's end in
an investigation is justified."). Accord Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. at 790, cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989).




of testing the sample each separately constitute fourth amendment
searches and seizures.
B. IS URINALYSIS REASONABLE?
Because collecting and testing the urine of arrestees for drug
metabolites amounts to a search and seizure, it must be reasonable
to perform urinalysis in order for it to be permissible under the
fourth amendment.74 The fourth amendment also requires that
the procedures for conducting urinalysis be constitutionally
reasonable.7 5
To date, no court has adjudicated the difficult issue of whether,
or under what circumstances, mandatory pre-arraignment urine
testing as permitted, for example, by the recent Arizona legisla-
tion,76 is a reasonable search and seizure. The constitutionality of
other aspects of the District of Columbia drug testing program how-
ever, is presently before the courts. Berry v. District of Columbia 77 in-
volves a claim that plaintiff's fourth amendment rights were violated
when he was ordered by a bail commissioner to provide a urine sam-
ple as a prerequisite for obtaining pretrial release and, because the
initial test was positive, to submit to regular periodic urinalysis while
awaiting trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia remanded for development of a factual record on which
the permissibility of post-arraignment urinalysis under the fourth
amendment can be evaluated. 78
Although the constitutionality of mass pre-arraignment testing
is not at issue in Berry, the ultimate outcome of that litigation may be
determinative of the questions raised in this Article. For example,
the court could decide that there is no correlation between positive
urine tests and dangerous crime and that urinalysis for the purpose
of informing the pretrial release decision is always unreasonable.
Given the general reluctance of the judiciary to engage in critical
examination of social science research,79 however, that outcome is
74 See Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
75 Id. at 1036.
76 See supra note 14.
77 833 F.2d at 1031.
78 Id. at 1034. Among the evidence that the appellate court suggested be developed
is proof of a positive correlation between drug use and arrestee performance on pretrial
release. Id. at 1035. The court further implied that even if there is a correlation be-
tween positive test results and pretrial crime, it will be necessary to show that those
crimes posed threats to community safety. Id. at 1035 n.17.
"Arraignment" refers to the first judicial appearance after arrest at which time the
pre-bail release decision is made in Washington, D.C.
79 See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748 (1987); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 278 (1987).
132 [Vol. 80
DRUG TESTING AT BAIL STAGE
unlikely. As a consequence, questions relating to the constitutional
legitimacy of pre-bail arrestee urinalysis will ultimately have to be
resolved by asking whether urinalysis of arrestees fits into any of the
many categories of searches and seizures that have been deemed
reasonable under the fourth amendment by the courts.
The epitome of a constitutionally reasonable search is one con-
ducted pursuant to a valid warrant issued upon probable cause.
Neither of these criteria can be met in the case of bail stage urine
testing. Urine testing of arrestees is normally, although not neces-
sarily, performed without probable cause-or even the less rigorous
standard of reasonable suspicion-to believe that evidence of drug
use will be found in the subject's urine.80 The fact that some studies
have shown that a large percentage of arrestees in some jurisdic-
tions are drug users is not sufficient to establish probable cause or
reasonable suspicion as to any particular arrested individual.$'
Without probable cause, it is impossible to obtain a valid search
warrant permitting urinalysis.
There are a number of well established exceptions to the search
warrant and the probable cause requirements. Any one of three
broad categories of exceptions could conceivably be offered to jus-
tify warrantless arrestee urinalysis performed without probable
cause: a search permitted by virtue of the subject's lawful arrest; a
non-criminal "administrative" search;8 2 or a consent search.
80 Except for the small minority of test subjects who have been arrested pursuant to
an arrest warrant, urine samples are obtained before ajudicial officer has had an oppor-
tunity to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the arrestee for any crime at
all. The Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia has noted that "[a] signifi-
cant number of cases-juvenile and adult-are 'no papered,' that is, dismissed without
formal charges having been filed." Brief of the Public Defender Service for the District
of Columbia as Amicus Curiae at 13, Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
81 In support of the District of Columbia testing program at issue in Beny, the United
States as amicus curiae argued that "an exceptionally large percentage of persons ar-
rested in the District are current drug users." Berry, 833 F.2d at 1036. The D.C. Circuit
correctly observed that this fact would not be a basis for a finding of suspicion, if individ-
ualized suspicion was required.
82 The term "administrative" appears in quotation marks because of the varying in-
terpretations accorded it in legal literature. At times, the term is used to refer to any
non-criminal search or seizure performed by a government agent. At other times the
term is used to refer only to the much narrower category of searches conducted by, or
under the auspices of, certain administrative agencies in the performance of their regu-
latory functions. The term as used in this Article has the former meaning. Searches
performed in the context of highly regulated industries are specifically designated as




1. Searches and Seizures of Property from Persons Who Have Been
Arrested for Suspected Criminal Activity
Individuals do not, by virtue of being arrested, lose their fourth
amendment right to privacy. Nonetheless, government officials pos-
sess relatively extensive rights to search arrestees and seize property
in their possession 83 under two exceptions to the search warrant
and probable cause requirements: searches incident to arrests and
booking (or inventory) searches. To be constitutionally reasonable,
the scope of a search in either category must be reasonably related
to the justifications that the Supreme Court has articulated for per-
mitting the searches to be conducted without a warrant or probable
cause.
a. Search incident to arrest
A search incident to an arrest permits police to search an arres-
tee's person and the area within his or her immediate control con-
temporaneous with the arrest.84 The search, for which neither
probable cause nor a lesser degree of individualized suspicion is
needed, is justified by: (1) the need to seize weapons or other items
the arrestee might use to assault the arresting officer or to escape;
and (2) the need to prevent destruction of evidence of the crime for
83 Arrest for a crime does not alter one's fourth amendment rights with respect to
other property. For example, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police cannot
search the entire house of a person who has been arrested for a crime without probable
cause and a search warrant. Cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)(refusing to hold
that any search of an arrestee or his property is reasonable).
84 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). There is some question as to how tem-
porally proximate to the arrest the search incident to an arrest must be. There is author-
ity indicating that a search incident to an arrest can occur at booking and as long as ten
hours after an arrest. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974)(holding that
seizure of defendants' clothing ten hours after his arrest and the subsequent search of
the clothing for paint chips did not violate the fourth amendment despite the lack of a
warrant where police had probable cause to believe that the paint chips would be found
in the clothing). The justification for upholding the warrantless search in Edwards, how-
ever, is uncertain. The majority opinion at varying points refers to searches incident to
arrest and to inventory searches and seizures of property in an arrestee's possession as
justifying the search. See, e.g., id. at 803 (referring to search incident to arrest); id. at 804-
05 (referring to usual procedure incident to arrest and incarceration). To add to the
confusion, the Court was careful to limit its decision to situations in which there is prob-
able cause for the search despite the absence of a warrant. Id. at 808 n.9. Probable
cause is not a requirement for either a search incident to an arrest or an inventory
search, and urinalysis is not a probable cause search. Further, the Supreme Court re-
fused to extend Edwards to hold that any search of an arrestee or his or her property is
reasonable. See id. at 808-09. Cf. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 (warrantless search of arrestee's
apartment under exigent circumstances did not permit police to extend search beyond
scope justified by the exigency in absence of probable cause).
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which the arrest was made. 5 The search incident to an arrest is
reasonable because of the important state interest in removing
weapons and evidence from the area where the arrestee can person-
ally gain access to them. The exception does not extend to evidence
that cannot be destroyed or concealed by the arrestee because it is
beyond his or her reach.
86
Urinalysis is not reasonably related to either of the justifications
for searches incident to arrest. Urine testing has no conceivable rel-
evance to discovery of a weapon or other items that the arrestee may
use to harm the arresting officer or to effectuate an escape. Nor can
urinalysis be construed as somehow related to preventing destruc-
tion of evidence by the arrestee. The presence of drug metabolites
in urine has no relevance as evidence of most crimes for which test
subjects have been arrested.8 7 Even if the individual was arrested
for a drug related crime, urinalysis programs at the pre-bail stage
have been explicitly designed not to obtain evidence of the crime 8
and it is not evidence that is in danger of destruction if it is not
immediately removed from the arrestee8 9 Therefore, urine testing
85 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 752.
86 See id.
87 Nor is it relevant as evidence of any other crime in jurisdictions that do not
criminalize actual ingestion of controlled substances. Police can only seize an item dis-
covered during a search incident to an arrest if they have probable cause to believe it is
evidence, an instrumentality or fruit of a crime. W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 60, at
60.
88 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the D.C. program.
The information obtained through urinalysis ostensibly is used solely for informing the
pretrial release decision. But see D.G. CODE ANN. § 23-1303(d) (1981 & Supp. 1988);
Jones v. United States, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (urinalysis results may be used at
trial for impeachment purposes).
89 In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a
blood sample or a comparable intrusion into the body of an arrestee could be made
without a warrant only when the search was performed in a reasonable manner, there
was "a clear indication that in fact [the evidence) will be found" (a stricter standard than
probable cause), and there were exigent circumstances because the evidence was evanes-
cent-that is, it would be lost if the police were required to take the time necessary to
obtain a warrant. Although urinalysis does not require an intrusion into the body, most
courts that have considered the question have concluded that urinalysis is either equal to
or more invasive than a blood test because it requires test subjects to perform a private
bodily function under observation. See infra note 149. Therefore, the Schmerber standard
would apply.
Warrantless urinalysis, however, does not meet the Schmerber standard. First, drug
metabolites are not evanescent evidence. But see infra note 135 (discussing cases in
which court assumed drugs were evanescent). Most drug metabolites remain in the
urine for at least 48 hours. Further, unlike blood alcohol or breathalyzer tests, urinalysis
does not reveal whether a subject is presently under the influence of illegal drugs.
Therefore, timeliness is much less critical. Second, urinalysis is not designed to obtain
evidence of the crime for which the subject was arrested and is not based on any individ-
ualized suspicion of drug use. Therefore, the Schmerber "clear indication standard" can-
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cannot logically be justified as a search incident to an arrest.
b. Booking searches
A person under lawful arrest may be required to undergo a
booking or inventory search before being placed in a holding cell.
Inventory searches are justified by the following objectives:
(1) protecting the arrestee's property while he is in jail; (2) protecting
the police from groundless claims that they have not adequately safe-
guarded the defendant's property; (3) safeguarding the detention fa-
cility by preventing the introduction therein of weapons or
contraband; and (4) ascertaining or verifying the identity of the person
arrested.90
The extent of the intrusion on the arrestee's right of privacy will be
balanced against these four objectives when determining whether a
booking search is reasonable.9 1
One difficulty in justifying urine testing as part of a standard
booking search is that its primary purpose is to determine whether a
person is a drug user for purposes of reaching a bail decision, rather
than for any of the goals that justify booking searches. It is equally
problematic to assert that a secondary purpose for urinalysis is rea-
sonably related to any of the existing justifications for booking
searches. Pre-bail drug testing has no apparent relevance to protec-
tion of the arrestee's property, to identifying the person arrested, or
to maintenance of detention facility security.9 2 Urinalysis indicates
not possibly be met. But see, Ewing v. State, 160 Ind. App. 138, 310 N.E.2d 571
(1974)(holding that warrantless urinalysis of person arrested for narcotics crime was
permissible under Schmerber and that the results were admissible in a probation revoca-
tion proceeding).
90 W. LaFave &J. Israel, supra note 60, at 147 (1985). See also Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640 (1983).
91 Many courts have concluded that urinalysis is as intrusive as a strip search. See,
e.g., infra notes 93 and 149. A number of courts have disapproved strip searches at
booking without individualized suspicion under this standard despite the fact that, un-
like urinalysis, strip searches are rationally related to the justifications for inventory
searches. See, e.g., Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir.
1986); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 740 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1985); Stewart v. Lub-
bock County, 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir.
1985); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053
(1985); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Clements v. Logan, 455 U.S. 942 (1982); Kathriner v.
City of Overland, 602 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Mo. 1984). See also Comment, 54 U. CIN. L.
REV. 175 (1985).
92 Any detention facility relevant to this discussion will be a short term holding facil-
ity for arrestees prior to the first appearance and bail hearing. Once it has been deter-
mined that a person will not be released on bail-either because bail is denied or due to
failure to post the required bond-the person becomes a pretrial detainee and may be
subjected to urinalysis on the same basis as a convicted prisoner. See infra notes 103-07
and accompanying text for a discussion of prisoner urinalysis.
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only that a person who tests positive may have used illegal drugs
sometime prior to providing a urine specimen; a positive test does
not and cannot indicate whether a person is presently under the in-
fluence of illegal drugs and, thus, does not serve as a means of de-
tecting a threat to security. Similarly, although a positive urine test
may raise questions about a defendant's possible addiction to drugs,
it does not provide evidence of addiction, nor does it indicate
whether a defendant is likely to introduce contraband or weapons
into the detention facility.93 Thus, fourth amendment objections to
urine testing are unlikely to be overcome merely by adding urinal-
ysis to the standardized booking procedure. 94 Examination of both
types of searches occurring at arrest, therefore, leads to the conclu-
sion that systematic pre-bail urine testing would not be permissible
under the fourth amendment solely because the test subjects are
persons who have been arrested for crimes.
2. Non-Criminal Searches and Seizures
There is a marked tendency in the literature to categorize
searches as either criminal or non-criminal depending on the gov-
ernment's primary purpose. Analysis usually follows from that clas-
sification. Criminal searches must either be based on a warrant or
fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Non-
criminal searches, on the other hand, rarely require warrants or
probable cause; there need only be a constitutionally reasonable ac-
commodation between legitimate government objectives and indi-
vidual rights of privacy. Pre-initial appearance urine testing to
inform the pretrial release decision is a hybrid; it occurs in a crimi-
nal context but, like booking searches, its primary purpose ostensi-
bly is not related to further prosecution of an individual. Although,
93 There is an additional consideration in the area of booking searches. There is
precedent indicating that the permissibility of some booking procedures may be depen-
dent upon the seriousness of the suspected crime. For example, strip searches are nor-
mally permitted during booking on the theory that they protect lock up security by
preventing contraband or weapons from being introduced into the facility. Nonetheless,
courts have held that strip searches of persons held for certain minor crimes are unrea-
sonable under the fourth amendment. See Giles, 746 F.2d at 614 (requiring individual-
ized reasonable suspicion to strip search persons arrested for minor crimes); Logan, 660
F.2d at 1013 (holding strip searches of detainees are constitutionally constrained by due
process requirements). The same reasoning extends to urinalysis of persons held for
minor crimes.
94 Whether urine testing is permissible in order to serve a new government objective,
in addition to that have been identified to date in connection with booking searches is
discussed in connection with whether mandatory pre-bail urinalysis is permissible as a
non-criminal search. If systematice mass pre-bail testing does not violate the fourth
amendment, in effect, identification of drug users through urine analysis would become
a part of standardized procedures. See infra notes 173-26 and accompanying text.
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as demonstrated in the prior section, when conceptualized as a crim-
inal search, bail stage urinalysis is not permissible, it may, under
certain circumstances, meet constitutional requirements for non-
criminal searches.
Non-criminal searches are performed to assist government
agencies in achieving legitimate objectives other than crime detec-
tion and prosecution, although inadvertent discovery of evidence of
a crime is a possible consequence and detection of criminal miscon-
duct in order to impose non-criminal sanctions may be a primary
purpose. Although criminal prosecution may not result from a non-
criminal search, important rights, privileges, or interests such as
continued employment, the right to attend school, or imposition of
civil fines and penalties may be at stake.
Generally, to determine whether a non-criminal search is rea-
sonable under the fourth amendment, a court must balance the de-
gree of intrusion on the subject's right of privacy against the
importance of the government's legitimate interest in conducting
the search.9 5 The outcome of that balance will dictate the circum-
stances, if any, under which the search is permissible. The decision
can theoretically range from a very strict holding that a search war-
rant and probable cause are required, 96 to a conclusion that the ex-
tent of intrusion on the individual privacy interest is so weak in
relation to the importance of the government goal that mandatory
or random searches are permitted without any degree of individual-
ized suspicion.9 7 Between these extremes are decisions holding that
95 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). On occasion, the
Supreme Court has used this same standard to determine whether criminal searches and
seizures meet fourth amendment standards. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 703 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Relying on a combination of the
criminal and administrative search traditions, the first stage of the standard that the D.C.
Circuit directed the district court to apply on remand in Berry v. District of Columbia,
833 F.2d 1031, 1034.
This standard appears to be undergoing revisions, at least in the employment and
school contexts. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of
O'Connor v. Ortega and infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
TLO standard. There is, however, considerable confusion among lower federal courts
and state courts as to whether, and at what stage, balancing remains necessary. See infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 833 F.2d 335
(D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom. Jenkins v.Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989). Variations on
the normal criminal search warrant have also been created. See, e.g., Camara v. Munici-
pal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)(approving area-wide inspections for health and safety
code violations, where warrant is obtained upon demonstration that inspection is pursu-
ant to reasonable legislative and administrative criteria).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)(INS may set up
fixed automobile checkpoints to briefly question occupants regarding immigration sta-
tus); McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978)(approving routine metal detector
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some degree of individualized suspicion is necessary before the
search will be reasonable.
98
Although no reported cases have yet addressed the question of
whether urinalysis of arrestees to determine conditions of pretrial
release is constitutional, 99 the reasonableness of mandatory and
random urine testing' 00 has been widely litigated in other non-crim-
inal contexts such as prisons,10 1 the military, public schools, and
public employment.'0 2 Balancing the extent of the test subject's pri-
vacy rights against the government's interest in conducting the
urine tests, the courts have decided on the facts of each case
whether urine testing is permissible at all and, if so, under what con-
ditions it is reasonable. To date, the outcomes of these decisions
and pat-down searches of persons entering courthouse); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d
1230 (6th Cir. 1972)(allowing search of briefcase of person entering federal building).
These cases consistently require that the intrusion on privacy rights be minimal, that
there be no room for officials to exercise discretion, and that the searches be reasonably
effective means of achieving the government's objective. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1979); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563-64; Gaioni v. Folmar, 460
F. Supp. 10, 14 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1146
(M.D.N.C. 1977).
98 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)(school officials may search
student when there are reasonable grounds to suspect search will turn up evidence of
violation of law or school rule); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)(discretionary
stops of automobiles to check for driver's license must be based on reasonable suspi-
cion); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)(roving border patrols may
only stop cars based upon reasonable suspicion that they contain illegal aliens).
99 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
100 Urine testing prior to the first appearance is generally performed uniformly on all
members of the subject group without regard for individualized suspicion of any kind.
Both mandatory testing (such as testing of all members of a subject group either at one
time or over a period of time, for example, when urinalysis is included as part of an
annual physical exam, or group members are tested on pre-defined occasions, such as
their return to employment after a leave of absence) and random testing share this sali-
ent characteristic and are therefore analogous for purposes of fourth amendment
analysis.
101 Periodic or on demand urine testing has also become increasingly common as a
condition of probation and parole. There do not appear, in the reported cases, to be
any general fourth amendment challenges to the propriety of this practice without either
individualized suspicion or prior consent. Instead, probationers and parolees have chal-
lenged the validity of specific condition, of release mandating urinalysis. Courts uphold
the condition on the theory that urinalysis is reasonably related to the rehabilitation and
public safety objectives of probation. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182
(7th Cir. 1986); Macias v. State, 649 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Grim. App. 1983).
102 Mandatory and random testing of the urine of amateur and professional athletes
has also received a great deal of publicity in the last few years. To date, there are no
reported decisions adjudicating the question of the propriety of such testing under the
fourth amendment. The issue, however, has been discussed in the academic literature.
See, e.g., Comment, Drugs, Athletes, and the NCAA: A Proposed Rule for Mandatory Drug Testing
in College Athletics, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 205 (1984); Comment, An Analysis of Public
College Athlete Drug Testing Programs Through the Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine and the
Fourth Amendment, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 815 (1987).
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are widely divergent both within and among particular contexts.
Nonetheless, some general trends can be discerned. Analysis of the
cases is helpful in predicting whether pre-bail arrestee urinalysis
would be viewed as reasonable by the courts, and if so, under what
conditions.
a. Prisoners
Searches of prisoners constitute a special category of adminis-
trative searches in which the privacy rights of the search subjects are
virtually non-existent and the government interest in conducting the
search is very strong.'0 3 Although by virtue of their status, prison-
ers lose many of the rights enjoyed by other citizens, they retain
their fourth amendment right to bodily privacy which is infringed by
urine testing.' 0 4 Nonetheless, a prisoner's privacy rights are sub-
stantially diminished in comparison to those of other citizens be-
cause they are subject to restriction and limitation in order to
achieve legitimate goals of the penal institution. When these mini-
mal individual interests are balanced against those of the govern-
ment, virtually any search conducted in a reasonable manner and
reasonably related to maintenance of order, security, and discipline
103 Prisoners include both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, because, for all
practical purposes, the fourth amendment rights of both groups are equivalent. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). Bell held that pretrial detainees' fourth amendment
rights are diminished (though not completely eradicated) by virtue of their incarceration
and the legitimate safety and administrative concerns of the correctional institution. No-
tably, none of the prisoner urinalysis cases reported to date involve pretrial detainees. It
is unlikely, however, that urinalysis of pretrial detainees would be treated differently
than urinalysis of convicted prisoners.
The arrestees who are the subjects of pre-bail urinalysis do not share the status of
the pretrial detainees who were the plaintiffs in Bell. Pretrial detainees are persons for
whom there has been a judicial determination that there is probable cause to hold them
for a crime as required by Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1976), and who have been
incarcerated because they either have been denied pretrial release, are unable to meet
the bail amount set, or have had their pretrial release revoked for violation of condi-
tions. Arrestees are those persons who have yet to appear before a judicial officer for
the purpose of determining probable cause and making a pretrial release determination.
Persons subject to post-arraingment testing, under circumstances similar to those
involved in Berry, are also distinguishable from pretrial detainees. Although they have
had their Gerstein hearing, they have been released pending trial. Thus, their fourth
amendment rights are not subject to the compelling safety and administrative concerns
of correctional institutions identified in Bell as amendment rights. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
104 In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a
prisoner does not have any right of privacy in his prison cell and that searches of cells
are not subject to the fourth amendment. Most lower courts have concluded that Hudson
is limited to a prisoner's right of privacy in places and possessions and does not apply to
the right to privacy in one's person. See, e.g., Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir.
1986); Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
[Vol. 80
DRUG TESTING AT BAIL STAGE
in the penal institution will be upheld.' 0 5
Applying the above principles, the majority of courts have up-
held random drug testing of prisoners against fourth amendment
challenges. 0 6 The courts have not agreed on the degree of intru-
siveness of observed urinalysis, though none has concluded there
was no privacy interest at all.'0 7 The test subjects' status as prison-
ers, however, substantially reduced the courts' assessment of the im-
portance of the individual interest when compared to the asserted
penal goals. Weighing the reduced privacy interest of the prisoners
against the legitimate threat to prison security, discipline, and order
from widespread drug use, these courts concluded that it was rea-
sonable to require randomly selected prisoners to provide urine
samples under direct observation by a guard or testing officer where
positive samples were to be used as the basis of disciplinary pro-
ceedings (usually involving loss of good time for the first of-
105 Thus, strip searches and body cavity searches of a prisoner are reasonable under
the fourth amendment if they are related to maintenance of institutional order, security
and discipline and are not an obviously excessive means of achieving the prison adminis-
tration's goal. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Prison officials'judgment
that certain policies or procedures are needed to achieve these goals are entitled to great
deference. A court should substitute its judgment only if substantial evidence in the
record indicates that the official response is exaggerated. Id. at 545-48. See generally
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 278 (1987).
This deferential treatment of correctional administrators appears, at least in some
cases, to weigh heavily against the privacy rights of prison employees as well as inmates.
Compare McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987)(permitting random urinal-
ysis of prison employees) with Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. Il1.
1987) (prohibiting random urinalysis of prison employees).
106 See, e.g., Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986); Storms v. Coughlin, 600
F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Hampson v. Satran, 319 N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1982). Cf.
Petition ofJohnston, 109 Wash. 2d 493, 502, 745 P.2d 864, 868 (1987) (holding random
urine tests of prisoners valid, although it is not clear whether a fourth amendment chal-
lenge was raised). The random testing programs in Hampson and Spence were upheld as
implemented. The Storms court granted an injunction against continuation of the urine
testing program because the method of selection was not truly random. The court
clearly stated, however, that adoption of a better method of random selection would
result in a constitutional program of urinalysis.
Use of urinalysis results to prove misconduct in prison disciplinary proceedings also
has been challenged frequently on procedural due process grounds. See generally, Com-
ment, Urinalysis Testing in Correctional Facilities, 67 B.U.L. REv. 475, 485-95 (1987) (review-
ing cases).
107 As in the public employment context, see infra notes 132-40 and accompanying
text, the degree of intrusiveness the courts assign to prisoner urinalysis is not necessarily
predictive of the outcome. Compare Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. at 1214 (equating urinalysis
with a body cavity search) and Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wisc.
1985)(equating urinalysis with a body cavity search) with Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 796
(stating urinalysis is less intrusive than a body cavity search). See generally, Cohen & King,
Drug Testing and Corrections, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 151, 157-59 (1987)(arguing that observed
urinalysis is most analogous to a "strip search and bodily inspection"; the intrusiveness
of such a search falls between a "strip and body cavity search" and a "strip search").
1989]
ROSEN AND GOLDKAMP
fense).' 08 Since prison administrators are entitled to substantial
judicial deference, 109 they have not been required to substantiate
their claims empirically that drug abuse is extensive or that random
testing is an effective deterrent. 1 0 Serious scrutiny of prison pro-
grams has, for the most part, been limited to the reasonableness of
the actual procedures, such as whether the selection process is truly
random or whether samples are collected under the least intrusive
conditions possible."'1
b. Military personnel
The United States military has employed urinalysis extensively.
In some instances random testing has been used; 1 2 for other pur-
poses mandatory testing of all persons similarly situated has been
adopted." 3 In military settings, the consequences of a positive test
may range from referral to counselling to initiation of court martial
proceedings. 114
Both random and mandatory urine testing in the military have
been upheld under fourth amendment challenges."i 5 These cases,
108 See supra note 106.
109 See supra note 105 (regarding deference to prison administrators).
110 The court in Hampson took into consideration information obtained from the de-
fendant's counsel at oral argument showing that, since drug testing had begun, the per-
centage of positive samples had dropped from fifty percent to ten percent. It concluded
that "the program has significantly decreased drug usage within the penitentiary."
Hampson, 319 N.W.2d at 800 n.3. In public school and employee cases, where courts
grant less deference to the government agencies, empirical evidence or other objective
facts are required to substantiate claims that a drug problem exists and that urine testing
can solve the problem. See infra, note 128 and accompanying text and note 164 and
accompanyng text.
111 See, e.g., Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D. N.Y. 1984). It is par-
ticularly intriguing that the one case in which a prison's random urine testing program
was held unconstitutional, in part, hinged on the failure of the government to allege that
deterrence of drug use was an objective. Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D.
Wis. 1985). To determine the extent of drug use by inmates in Wisconsin prisons, cor-
rectional authorities decided to conduct urinalysis on a random sample of fifteen per-
cent of all prisoners. Testing was conducted without advance notice but was
anonymous, and unlike the cases discussed above, positive samples would not lead to
any disciplinary actions. Refusal to provide a sample, however, led to disciplinary action
for failing to follow orders. The court held that on the record the facts were insufficient
to establish that the program served a legitimate institutional need for security, order,
and discipline as required by Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
112 See Abney, Drug Abuse, Courts-Martial, and Random Urinalysis - An Unworkable Combina-
tion, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1985)(describing the random testing program).
113 See, e.g., Murray v. Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (CMA 1983)(return from leave urine
testing).
114 Abney, supra note 112, at 3.
115 See Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Murray v.
Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (CMA 1983). Callaway involved "intrusive" drug inspections of
servicemen's persons and property. It is not apparent from the opinion that urinalysis
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however, are not very helpful in attempting to determine whether
mandatory urinalysis of arrestees is permissible in the criminal jus-
tice setting because constitutional standards apply differently to mil-
itary personnel than to civilians. The need for obedience and
discipline essential to military effectiveness has justified limitations
on the rights of military personnel that would not be condoned for
others. 116 Although military personnel retain their fourth amend-
ment rights, their expectation of privacy is less than that of civil-
ians.' 17 When this diminished expectation of privacy is balanced
against the military's very strong interest in identifying and deter-
ring drug users, 118 the scales inescapably tip in the government's
favor. Drug abuse in the military threatens the effectiveness and
readiness of the armed forces to accomplish its mission of defending
the United States. 1 9 In a context in which inspections intruding on
ordinary privacy rights in one's person and property are an accepted
part of life, the necessity of maintaining an alert and ready military
justifies mandatory testing under certain circumstances, unan-
nounced testing, and random testing of all personnel.
120
c. Public school students
Both prisoners and military personnel certainly appear to enjoy
was part of these inspections. However, the Court of Military Appeals later, in Murray,
16 MJ. at 78, referred to Callaway as a case involving urinalysis. Even if the Callaway did
not involve urinalysis it is very strong precedent because it invloved highly intrusive
strip searches. Urinalysis is equally or less intrusive, but certainly not more intrusive.
See supra note 107 and infra notes 149-154 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
intrusiveness of urinalysis.
116 "The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for im-
position of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be
constitutionally impermissible outside of it." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974),
quoted in Callaway, 518 F.2d at 477; Murray, 16 MJ. at 81.
117 Callaway, 518 F.2d at 477; Murray, 16 MJ. at 81.
118 In Callaway, the court accepted the argument that unannounced inspections were
necessary for deterrence: "Given the nature of drugs and the paraphernalia associated
therewith, unannounced drug inspections appear to be the most effective means of iden-
tifying drug users so that they might receive treatment and eliminating illegal debilitat-
ing drugs from a unit." Calloway, 518 F.2d at 476. The court based its conclusion that
requiring a warrant would likely frustrate the government purpose behind the search, in
part, on the fact that it would increase the possibility of advance notice of searches and
thus minimize the effectiveness of inspections. Id.
119 Callaway, 518 F.2d at 476-77; Murray, 16 M.J. at 81. In Callaway, the court noted
statistical evidence regarding the extent of drug abuse in the military and its impact on
military effectiveness. 518 F.2d at 476 nn.24-25.
120 Murray v. Haldeman, 16 MJ. 74, 81 (C.M.A. 1983). Accord Committee for G.I.
Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This same rationale is at least
partially responsible for decisions upholding urinalysis of police officers, correctional
officers and nuclear power plant employees without individualized suspicion. See infra
note 167 and accompanying text.
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fewer fourth amendment rights than accused persons entering the
criminal process at the arrest stage. Diminished expectations of pri-
vacy, however, do not alone tip the balance in favor of either ran-
dom or mandatory searches. Consideration of cases involving
public school students demonstrates that the importance of the gov-
ernment interest and the degree of deference due the government
agency also play important roles. As a practical matter, courts ap-
pear much more willing to review school administrators' decisions
critically than those of correctional administrators or of the
military. 121
The fourth amendment rights of public school students are sub-
ject to the school administrator's interest in maintaining discipline
in the classroom and on school grounds.' 22 School officials may
search a student's person or property on less than probable cause so
long as the search is reasonable under the circumstances. A school
search is reasonable if it is justified at its inception and is reasonably
related in scope to the government objectives that made it permissi-
ble in the first instance. A search is justified at its inception when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will re-
veal evidence that the student has violated either a law or a school
rule. 123
In the two reported decisions applying this standard to evaluate
the constitutionality of urine testing of students by school officials,
school testing policies have been held invalid. ' 24 In Odenheim v. Carl-
stadt-East Rutherford Regional School District,'25 the court held that a
school's policy requiring all students to provide urine samples for
121 But see Schaill v. Tippicanoe School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 855 (N.D. Ind. 1988)
(according considerable deference to school administrators).
122 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985). In T.L.O., the court did not
specify whether a student's rights were equal to those of an adult or those of a minor
outside of school. It did, however, reject the notion that students have no fourth
amendment rights at all when in school. It is likely that, if pressed, the Court would
hold that students enjoy fewer fourth amendment rights when in school than when out
of school. See Id. (Powell, J., concurring)(students' expectation of privacy diminished
because school stands in loco parentis).
123 Id. T.L.O. involved the search of a student's pocketbook. It is not clear whether
the "reasonable grounds" standard requires individualized suspicion for all types of
school searches.
124 In a third case, Schaill, 679 F. Supp. at 833, the court refused to enjoin implemen-
tation of a program in which high school students were required to consent to random
urinalysis as a condition of participating in interscholastic athletics. Although the pre-
cise grounds for the court's resolution of the fourth amendment issues are unclear, it
appears to have decided that the consent was valid under the fourth amendment because
participation in interscholastic athletics was not a constitutionally protected interest. See
generally infra notes 227-244 and accompanying text.
125 211 NJ. Super. 54, 510 A.2d 709 (1985).
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drug testing as part of an annual physical examination violated the
students' fourth amendment rights.1 26 The court concluded that
even if the testing policy's purpose was, as the school asserted, to
inquire into a medical condition in order to identify students with
drug problems for rehabilitation, mandatory urinalysis violated the
students' reasonable expectations of privacy.1 27 In contrast to the
prison cases, the court was unwilling to hold that the means of
achieving this legitimate government objective were reasonable in
the absence of evidence that drug abuse was a widespread problem
or that dragnet testing was an effective method for identifying drug
abusers. The court implied that the school's objectives could be
achieved if testing was limited to cases where there was individual-
ized suspicion of drug abuse. Given relatively small absolute num-
bers and percentages of students who had been referred to drug
counselling in prior years, the testing policy was "not reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place." 128
Urine testing of students may not always be permissible even
when there is individualized suspicion. In Anable v. Ford,129 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas
held that even when there was probable cause to believe that a stu-
dent had been violating school rules prohibiting use of illegal drugs
on school property and that a urine test would reveal the presence
of drug metabolites in the student's urine, urine testing was unrea-
sonable. Because an immunoassay test cannot reveal whether the
students were under the influence of drugs at school, its use was not
reasonably related to maintenance of order and security nor to pres-
ervation of the educational environment. 3 0 The court in Anable fur-
ther suggested that testing may not be permissible even where there
is probable cause when there are less intrusive methods of obtaining
the desired evidence.1
3 1
126 Detailed discussion of the Carlstadt-East Rutherford policy can be found in Com-
ment, School Drug Tests: A Fourth Amendment Perspective, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 275 (1987).
127 Odenheim, 211 N.J. Super. at 61, 510 A.2d at 713.
128 Id.
129 653 F. Supp. 22, 44 (W.D. Ark. 1985).
130 The court also found that the manner in which urine tests were conducted in An-
able was unreasonable. High school students were required to disrobe from the waist
down and urinate into a tube while an adult school official of the same sex watched.
Under the circumstances, this was an excessive intrusion into the students' legitimate
expectations of privacy. Id. at 41.
131 See id.
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d. Public employees
The courts have considered the permissibility under the fourth
amendment of urine testing for drug metabolites most often in cases
involving urinalysis of public employees.13 2 Most courts that have
confronted the constitutionality of urine testing of current' 33 em-
ployees have held that neither mandatory nor random testing is per-
missible, but that testing may be conducted in the presence of some
variety of individualized suspicion.1 34 Probable cause is not re-
132 Urine testing is currently popular in private industry and numerous court chal-
lenges have been filed by employees and unions. These cases, however, are not relevant
because the fourth amendment constrains only government action and thus is not a
relevant factor under private employment contracts.
The past few years have seen the proliferation of a vast literature on the subject of
private and public employee drug testing. See generally, Anastaplo, Governmental Drug-
Testing and the Sense of Community, 11 NOVA L.J. 295 (1987); Barnes & White, Employee
Privacy Rights "Everything You Always Wanted to Know--But Shouldn't", 64 MICH. B.J. 1104
(1985); Bishop, Employees' Assertion of Privacy Rights is Giving Employers Legal Hangovers, 6
CALIF. L. REv. 29 (1986); Bookspan, Behind Open Doors: Constitutional Implications of Gov-
ernment Employee Drug Testing, I 1 NOVA L.J. 307 (1987); Connors & Engle, Alcohol and Drug
Testing: Legal Considerations, 42 J. Mo. B. 523 (1986); Halbert, Coming Up Dirty: Drug Test-
ing at the Workplace, 32 VILL. L. REv. 691 (1987); Heins, The Right to Be Let Alone-Drug
Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 21 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 119 (1987);Joseph, Fourth Amend-
ment Implications of Public Sector Work Place Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L. J. 605 (1987); Miller,
Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees: Toward a General Rule
of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PiTT. L. REV. 201 (1986); Rust, Drug Testing:
The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A. J. Nov. 1986 at 50; Zeese, Urine Testing and the Fourth Amendment,
14 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 97 (1987); Comment, Behind the Hysteria of Compulsory Drug
Screening in Employment: Urinalysis Can Be a Legitimate Tool for Helping Resolve the Nation's
Drug Problem if Competing Interests of Employer and Employee Are Equitably Balanced, 25 DuQ. L.
REV. 597 (1987); Comment, Drug Testing in the Work Place; A Legislative Proposal to Protect
Privacy, 13J. LEGIS. 269 (1986); Comment, Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug
Urinalysis Constitutional in California?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1451 (1986); Comment, Em-
ployee Drug Testing: Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 52 Mo. L. REV. 625 (1987); Comment,
Employee Privacy Rights v. Business Needs: Drug Testing in the Work place, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV.
413 (1987); Comment, Drug Testing of Government Employees and the Fourth Amendment: The
Need For a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1063 (1987); Comment,
'Jar Wars" in the Workplace: The Constitutionality of Urinalysis Programs Designed to Eliminate
Substance Abuse Among Federal Employees, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 937 (1987); Comment, The
Drug-Free Federal Workplace: A Constitutional Procedure, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1335 (1987);
Note, Specimen Surveillance - The Fifth Circuit Approves Urine Testing, 33 Lov. L. REV. 1148
(1988); Note, A Proposal for Mandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civiliam Employees, 62 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 322 (1987); Note, Constitutional Law: Urinalysis and the Public Employer - Another
Well-Delineated Exception to the Warrant Requirement?, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1986); Note,
Workers, Drinks and Drugs: Can Employers Test?, 55 U. CINN. L. REv. 127 (1986); Note, Drug
Testing: America's New Work Ethic?, 15 STETSON L. REV. 883 (1986).
133 Cases addressing only the question of whether job applicants may be tested are
not useful for purposes of this analysis. Unlike current employees, applicants have no
right to government employment. Because they can avoid being tested merely by not
applying for the job, submission to the test constitutes implied consent to the search and
seizure. See infra notes 227-244 for a discussion of consent.
134 See RLEA v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 587 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1402
(1989); NFFE v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416 (D.D.C. 1988); Wrightsell v. City of Chicago,
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quired.13 5 Rather, the courts usually define the requisite factual ba-
678 F. Supp. 727, 732 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Sunline Transit
Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1569 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F.
Supp. 578, 592 (N.D. Ohio 1987); PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. 779, 790
(D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 850 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989);
Taylor v. O'Grady. 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1439 (N.D. Ill. 1987); AFGE v. Weinberger, 651
F. Supp. 726, 733 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D.
Ga. 1985); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 387
(E.D. La. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.granted, 108 U.S. 1072 (1988);
Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Lovvorn v. City of Chatta-
nooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507, 1516-1520 (D.N.J. 1986);Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508-1509
(D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted andjudgment vacated sub.
nom. Jenkins v.Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989); Smith v. City of East Point, 183 Ga. App.
659, 359 S.E.2d 692 (1987), rev'd, 258 Ga. 111,365 S.E.2d 432 (1988); City of Palm Bay
v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Fraternal Order of Police
v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461, 474, 524 A.2d 430, 437 (1987); Caruso v. Ward,
133 Misc. 2d 544, 557, 506 N.Y.S. 2d 789, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1986) aff'd, 131 A.D. 2d 214,
520 N.Y.S. 2d 551 (1987); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Edu-
cation, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 69, 510 N.E.2d 325, 330, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 462 (1987). Other
cases have held that specific urine tests which were in fact based upon reasonable indi-
vidualized suspicion did not violate the fourth amendment. See Everett v. Napper, 833
F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir. 1987); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D.
Ga. 1985); Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008-09 (D.C. 1985);
King v. McMickens, 120 A.D.2d 351, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1986). Cf. Division 241, Amal-
gamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1976) (upholding warrantless urinalysis of any bus operator involved in a seri-
ous accident or suspected of being under the influence of drugs while at work if two
supervisors agree that test should be conducted).
135 Most cases do not even address the possibility that a search warrant may be re-
quired to conduct employee urinalysis. When the issue is discussed, search warrants
generally are held unnecessary on the theory that requiring government employers to
obtain a search warrant before conducting urinalysis would unduly interfere with
achievement of a legitimate, non-criminal government objective. See, e.g., Taylor v.
O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1436 (N.D. Ill. 1987). This conclusion is based either on
the view that evidence of drug metabolites in urine is evanescent, see, e.g., RLEA v. Burn-
ley, 839 F.2d 575, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1988) rev'd, sub nom. Skinner v. RLEA, 109 S. Ct.
1402 (1989); PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. 779, 785 (D.NJ. 1987) rev'd,
850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989); Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Sunline Transportation Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1567-68 (C.D. Cal. 1987),
or on the conclusion that the delay necessary to establish probable cause or to obtain a
warrant may seriously impede the government's purpose for conducting the search. See
id. The conclusion that the evidence obtained from urinalysis is evanescent is errone-
ous. See supra note 89. Notably, each of the cases in which the courts have reached that
conclusion involved alcohol tests as well as drug tests. Evidence of alcohol intoxication
dissipates within a few hours. Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that even in a
criminal context, a search warrant is not required to perform a blood test for alcohol so
long as there is probable cause. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
One early district court decision held that probable cause was necessary to perform
urinalysis on a school bus attendant. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C.
1986) rev'd, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. granted andjudgment vacated sub nom. Jen-
kins v.Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989). On the government's appeal, however, the D.C.
Circuit held that it was reasonable to perform urine tests for drugs as part of a
mandatory employment related annual physical examination so long as the scope of the
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sis upon which testing may be permitted as reasonable
individualized suspicion.136  Decisions upholding random or
mandatory employee urinalysis without individualized suspicion
constitute a substantial minority of the numerous cases that have
been litigated in this area in the past few years.
13 7
search was reasonably related to a legitimate govermrhent objective. However, there was
no reasonable relation because current technology cannot reveal whether the test sub-
ject used or was under the influence of drugs while at work-the employer's sole inter-
est. Therefore, Jones was tested in violation of the fourth amendment. Jones v.
McKenzie, 833 F.2d at 340-41 cert. granted and judgement vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones,
109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989).
136 The standard is usually defined as reasonable suspicion based upon specific objec-
tive and articulable facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom. See, e.g., Wrightsell v.
City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 732 (N.D. 111. 1988); PBA v. Washington Township,
672 F. Supp. 779, 791 (D.N.J. 1987) rev'd, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 109 S.
Ct. 1637 (1989); Amalgamated Transit Union, 663 F. Supp. at 1567-68; Feliciano, 661 F.
Supp. at 589; Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517 (D.N.J. 1986); Bostic
v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers, 70 N.Y.2d. at 69, 517 N.Y.S.2d. at 462, 510 N.E.2d at 330. There are, however,
variations. In Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 436, the court specified that drug tests were only
permissible if "based upon a reasonable, articulable, and individualized suspicion that a
specific employee is under the influence of drugs or alcohol while on duty." The stan-
dard may be quite specific, specifying the kinds of facts that will constitute reasonable
suspicion. See, e.g., RLEA, 839 F.2d at 578 n.7, rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. RLEA, 109 S. Ct.
1402 (1988). Corroboration by a second observer may be required. See id. One judge,
writing the lead opinions in two connected cases for a divided panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, recently concluded that urinalysis is impermissi-
ble unless there is either individualized suspicion or evidence of a significant drug prob-
lem among the employee population being tested. Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1547; Penny,
846 F.2d at 1568.
In other cases, courts erroneously include a person's involvement in an accident as
a basis for individualized suspicion. See, e.g., Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733 (S.D. Ga.
1986) ("actual evidence of a trustworthy nature pointing toward drug use or occurrence
of an accident involving government property"); Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976)(warrantless urinalysis of any bus operator involved in a
serious accident or suspected of being under the influence of drugs while at work is
permissible where tests are conducted only if two supervisors agree), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1029 (1989). Cf. Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 1987)(em-
ployee's voluntary consent to urinalysis obviates need to determine whether there was
reasonable suspicion).
137 Wrightsell, 678 F. Supp. at 733, and Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d at 340 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. granted andjudgement vacated sub nom. Jenkins v.Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989),
upheld urine testing for drug metabolites that was included in mandatory, non-pretex-
tual physical examinations. In PBA, 850 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1637 (1989); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel,
795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Pa. 1988); AFGE v. Dole,
670 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1987); and Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District, 653 F.
Supp. 1510 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988), random and mandatory
urinalysis of employees working in highly regulated industries was permitted on the the-
ory that licensing requirements and comprehensive regulatory schemes substantially re-
duced the employees' privacy expectations. But cf Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. SEPTA, 863 F.2d 1110 (1988) (3d Cir. 1988), aft'g, Transportation Work-
ers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Pa. 1988)(rejecting the district court's analysis on
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As with other non-criminal searches, a search and seizure of a
public employee by a government employer must be reasonable to
pass constitutional muster.138 In March 1987, the Supreme Court
decided O'Connor v. Ortega,13 9 in which a plurality articulated a stan-
dard for determining the fourth amendment reasonableness of gov-
ernment work place searches. The plurality held that the fourth
amendment requires searches conducted in the course of public em-
ployer investigations of work-related misconduct to be reasonable
under all the circumstances. Under this standard of reasonableness,
the search must be justified at its inception and the scope must be
reasonably related to the government objective. A search will be
justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for sus-
pecting that the search will reveal the evidence sought. The Court
declined to determine whether individualized suspicion was re-
quired for there to be reasonable grounds because there was indi-
vidualized suspicion in the case at bar.1
40
The plurality specifically stated that its standard applied only to
a search of property within the workplace and did not consider the
appropriate fourth amendment standard for assessing the reasona-
bleness of drug and alcohol testing of employees. 14 1 Nonetheless,
subsequent lower court cases have purported to follow the plural-
ity's standard although there is considerable disagreement regard-
ing the precise nature of the test and the extent, to which it is
applicable to searches and seizures that implicate an individual's
right to bodily privacy as opposed to privacy interests in prop-
erty. 142 As a practical matter, most courts continue to balance the
extent of the intrusion on the employee's reasonable expectation of
the highly regulated industry theory and holding that the government's real safety con-
cerns and the documentation of a drug problem among the work force outweighed the
workers' "more than minimal" privacy interests). One other case, National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1072 (1988), upheld testing of employees who sought promotion to certain sensitive
positions. Von Raab is more analogous to urinalysis ofjob applicants than to employee
testing. See supra note 133.
138 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
139 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
140 480 U.S. at 726.
141 480 U.S. at 729.
142 See, e.g., Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 586 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Dkinner v. RLEA,
109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1987) cert.
granted andjudgment vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989); Everett v.
Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11th Cir. 1987); NFFE v.Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 731 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
PBA v. Township of Washington, 672 F. Supp. 779, 786 (D.N.J. 1987); Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1567 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 583 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
1989] 149
ROSEN AND GOLDKAMP
privacy against the employer's legitimate interest in accomplishing
the objectives to which the search is reasonably related in order to
determine what quantum of evidence, if any, is required before
urinalysis can be performed. If the search is justified at its incep-
tion, the court will then examine the reasonableness of its scope in
relation to the government's legitimate objectives.
Assessment of the nature of the individual interests at stake in
employee urinalysis begins with the general proposition that the
government, as an employer, has a legitimate interest in strictly su-
pervising thejob-related behavior and performance of its employees
to promote efficient and proper operation of the workplace.
143
While public employees do not completely forfeit their constitu-
tional rights by virtue of their jobs, 144 their legitimate expectations
of privacy vis a vis their employers in the context of the employment
relationship may be reduced. 145 On the continuum of diminished
expectations of privacy, however, public employees rights are
greater than those of either prisoners or the military' 46 and less than
those of other citizens.1
47
Courts are unanimous in their conclusions that employee
urinalysis intrudes upon reasonable expectations of privacy
1 48
143 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F.
Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Whether off-duty drug use-as opposed to on-duty
intoxication-is within the government's realm of interest is a matter of dispute. Com-
pare, e.g.,Jones, 833 F.2d at 341; Burnley, 839 F.2d at 588; NFFE v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp.
416, 423-26; with Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. SEPTA, 863 F.2d 1110 (3d
Cir. 1988); Washington Township, 850 F.2d at 136; Bostic, 650 F. Supp. at 250, McDonell,
809 F.2d at 1309.
144 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1988).
145 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715; Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 733 (S.D.
Ga. 1986); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. 461, 472, 524
A.2d 430, 436 (1987); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education,
70 N.Y.2d 57, 69, 510 N.E.2d at 323, 330, 517 N.Y.S. 456, 462 (1987) (teachers have
diminished expectation of privacy with respect to state inquiry into physical fitness).
The plurality in O'Connor held that, due to the operational realities of the workplace, the
precise extent of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy must be assessed on
an ad hoc basis in the context of the actual employment relationship. 480 U.S. at 717.
146 See Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 555-56, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 798 (Sup. Ct.
1986).
147 See Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 1986);
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. 1985).
148 See supra note 51 for cases holding that urinalysis is a search. But see Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267 (7th Cir. 1976)(stating that employees "have
no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to submitting to blood and urine
tests"). This statement was made, however, in the context of balancing the individual
interest against what the court termed a "paramount" employer interest in insuring that
bus and train operators were fit to perform theirjob. Thus, rather than concluding that
the employees had no reasonable expectations of privacy, the court held that the indi-
vidual interests at stake were outweighed by the public interests.
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There is considerable disagreement, however, regarding the weight
or extent of the individual interest implicated by urine testing. A
number of courts have found urinalysis comparable to highly intru-
sive strip searches or body cavity searches. 149 Courts often point to
the fact that urination is generally considered to be so private an act
that public urination is frequently prohibited by law.150 Being re-
quired to urinate on demand under observation by another person
is degrading and humiliating. 151 The conclusion that urinalysis
constitutes a substantial intrusion on privacy rights is not limited to
cases involving observed urination; some courts have also deemed
unobserved urination to be "highly intrusive." 152 These courts rea-
son that urinalysis implicates values at the heart of the fourth
amendment because the information it uncovers intrudes upon
one's private life.' 53 In contrast, other decisions view unobserved
urinalysis as less intrusive than a blood test, barely infringing on the
test subjects' fourth amendment rights at all. 5 Curiously, the as-
149 See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.NJ. 1986); Patch-
ogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 70 N.Y.2d at 67-68, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 461, 510 N.E.2d at
329. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 589 (observed urination categorized as highly intrusive search
and seizure of bodily fluids); AFGE v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 726, 733 (S. D. Ga.
1986) ("the taking of a urine sample most closely resembles the taking of a blood sam-
ple, which has been held to be a highly invasive search and seizure").
150 See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union, 663 F. Supp. 1568; Felciano, 661 F. Supp. 589;
Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514; Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d at
437; Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (App. Div. 1986).
151 See, e.g., Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 588; Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1514; Caruso v.
Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 548, 506 N.Y.S.2d, 789, 793 (Sup. Ct. 1986), af'd, 131 A.D.2d
214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1987). See also Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216
NJ. Super. 461, 474, 524 A.2d 430, 437 (urinalysis is profoundly demeaning).
152 See, e.g., PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. 779, 789-90 (D.NJ. 1987);
Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 588-89; AFGE v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 734. Cf. Taylor
v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1435 (N.D. Ill. 1987)(correctional employees have
"fairly strong expectation of privacy in the place, act, and decision of urination"). But see
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177 (5th Cir.
1987) (pre-scheduled, unobserved testing "not as intrusive as an invasion of bodily in-
tegrity or of the home, nor do employees suffer the indignity of either strip or body
cavity searches").
153 See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 339; NFFE v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416,
434; PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. at 787-90; Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at
588; Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 734.
154 Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 734 (N.D. I11. 1988) (minimal
intrusion where urine sample taken as part of non-pretextual physical exam); Transport
Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. 543, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1988)(unobserved urination and
other procedures "markedly reduce intrusiveness"); AFGE v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 444,
447-49 (D.D.C. 1987)(minimal intrusion where testing "discrete and private," advance
notice of random testing program given, and employees already subjected to pre-sched-
uled testing); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. at
1569 (private urination and confidentiality measures); Mack v. U.S., 653 F. Supp. 70, 74-
75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(less intrusive than a fingerprint). Cf.Jones, 833 F.2d at 340 (minimi-
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sessment of the degree of intrusiveness of urinalysis is not necessar-
ily predictive of the outcome of the decision.
On the other side of the balancing equation is the government's
interest in utilizing urine testing to identify users of illegal drugs
among its employees. It is generally recognized that public employ-
ers, like their private counterparts, have a right to a drug free work-
place. However, neither that interest in and of itself, nor the related
claim that drug use is incompatible with government employment, is
sufficient to justify random or mandatory urinalysis. 155 The govern-
ment generally asserts that the drug testing program under judicial
review will achieve more specific goals. The specific objectives of-
fered to justify urinalysis programs naturally vary depending upon
the nature of the .employees subject to testing and the particular
problems confronted by individual employers. Nonetheless, the in-
terests can be categorized generally as: (1) public safety; 156 (2) em-
zation of intrusion on privacy interests due to fact urinalysis is conducted as part of
annual medical examination relevant to reasonableness of scope of search).
155 See Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 433; Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D.
Ga. 1986).
156 See, e.g., PBA v. Washington Township, 850 F.2d at 136 (law enforcement officers)
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989); RLEA v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 586 (9th Cir. 1986)
(railroad employees), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. RLEA, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989);Jnes, 833,
F.2d at 340 (school bus drivers and attendants); NFFE v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (civilian law enforcement employees of Department of Defense); Car-
lucci, 680 F. Supp. at 423-26, 433 (civilian employees, civilian law enforcement employ-
ees, and civilian employees occupying critical positions relating to nuclear and chemical
warfare material of Department of Defense); Transport Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp.
543, 549 (operating employees of public transit authority); AFGE v. Dole, 670 F. Supp.
at 448 ("critical" employees of Department of Transportation); Amalgamated Transit
Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1569 (bus drivers and maintenance
workers); AFGE v. Weinberger 651 F. Supp. at 735 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (civilian police on
military base); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985)(police and fire fighters); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789
(Sup. Ct. 1986)(police officers assigned to Organized Crime Control Bureau). Cf. Tur-
ner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008 (D.C. App. 1985)("use of con-
trolled substances by police officers creates a situation fraught with serious
consequences to the public"). For the most part, these courts accept the argument that
drug use by the affected employees poses a direct risk to public safety on its face, pre-
sumably because the employees are operating hazardous equipment or are armed. But
see PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. at 791 (pointing to failure to show iden-
tifiable risk to public in rejecting random testing of police). Rarely is any evidence of-
fered that a risk to public safety is, in fact, present. A notable exception is Brotherhood
of Locomotive Engineers v. SEPTA, in which the court upheld a random testing pro-
gram in part because of the recent history of drug-related transit accidents. 863 F.2d
1110 (3rd Cir. 1988). Compare Burnley, 839 F.2d at 579 (despite empirical evidence and
employees' concession that alcohol and drug abuse presented serious safety problem,
post accident testing unconstitutional).
Another variation on the public safety theme arises in the context of public school
teachers. In Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 119
A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986), the government argued that urine testing of all
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ployee fitness and effectiveness; 157 (3) workplace safety;' 58 (4)
promotion of public confidence in employees' integrity;159 and, (5)
prevention of corruption and maintenance of security.' 60 In addi-
teachers before they were granted tenure was related to confirming the ability of teach-
ers to safeguard and supervise students. The court concluded that mandatory testing
was not justified by this objective, which it specifically stated was not as important a
government interest as it is in cases such as those involving police officers, fire fighters
or bus drivers where drug use could cause imminent danger to the public. Id. at 39, 505
N.Y.S.2d at 891.
157 See, e.g., Burnley, 839 F.2d at 586 (railroad operating employees); Everett v. Naper,
833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11th Cir. 1986) (fire fighter); Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335
(attendant on school bus for handicapped children); Weinberger, 818 F.2d at 937 (DOD
civilian law enforcement employees); Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178 (customs service em-
ployees); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987)(correctional of-
ficers); Wrightsell, 678 F. Supp. at 733 (police officers); PBA v. Washington Township,
672 F. Supp. at 790 (law enforcement officers); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F.
Supp. at 588 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (police academy cadets); Bostic, 650 F. Supp. at 250 (po-
lice); Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1326 (police and fire fighters); Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers, 70 N.Y.2d at 69, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 462, 510 N.E.2d at 330 (teachers). Concern
for the general welfare of employees is included in this category. See, e.g., Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. at 1569 (bus drivers and mainte-
nance workers).
158 See, e.g., NFFE v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d at 937 (DOD civilian law enforcement em-
ployees); Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178 (customs service employees); McDonell v. Hunter,
809 F.2d at 1307 (correctional officers); Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 423-26, 433 (civilian
aviation employees, civilian law enforcement employees, and civilian emplyees occupy-
ing critical positions with regard to nuclear and chemical warfare material of Depart-
ment of Defense); Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 735 (civilian military police); Bauman, 475
So. 2d at 1326 (Fla. App. 1985)(police and fire fighters). This category includes protec-
tion of both persons and property from harm.
159 See, e.g., PBA v. Washington Township, 850 F.2d at 141 (police officers), cert. denied.
109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d at 1138 (jockeys); National
Treasury Union V. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 178 (customs service employees); Carlucci,
680 F. Supp. at 423-26, 433 (civilian law enforcement employees and employees in-
volved in drug and alcohol abuse counselling and testing); Transport Workers v.
SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. 416, 549 (operating employees of public transit authority); AFGE
v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (DOT critical employees); Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. at 1569 (bus drivers and mainte-
nance workers); Felidano, 661 F. Supp. at 588 (police academy cadets); AFGE v. Wein-
berger, 651 F. Supp. at 735 (civilian police on military base); Bostic v. McClendon, 650
F. Supp. at 250 (police); Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1326 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985)(police and
fire fighters); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216 NJ. Super. 461, 475, 524
A.2d 430, 437, 552 (1987)(police officers assigned to Narcotics Bureau); Caruso v.
Ward, 133 Misc.2d 544, 552, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 795 (Sup. Ct. 1986)(police officers as-
signed to Organized Crime Control Bureau). See Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422,
1439 (N.D. Il1. 1987) (correctional officers; stating that no court has ever considered this
interest sufficient in and of itself to justify mandatory urinalysis).
160 See, e.g., Weinberger, 818 F.2d at 937 (posing potential for drug related blackmail
leading to disclosure of classified information); Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178 (customs sei-
vice employees); Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1138 (jockeys); Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 423-26,
433 (civilian law enforcement employees and civilian emplyees occupying critical posi-
tions with regard to nuclear and chemical warfare material of Department of Defense);
AFGE v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 735 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (civilian military police);
Caruso, 133 Misc.2d at 552, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (narcotics officers).
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tion to these particularized reasons why drug abuse is deleterious in
the workplace, public employers often claim that either mandatory
or random testing programs are necessary to deter employee drug
abuse or to build public confidence that the work force is drug
free. 161
While recognizing that concerns like safety, employee fitness,
and prevention of corruption are legitimate and often compelling
objectives, 16 2 the majority of courts have held that it is not constitu-
tionally reasonable to accomplish them through either mandatory or
random testing. 163 Often this decision is based upon the lack of em-
pirical or other objective evidence that abuse of illegal drugs is a
significant problem in the affected work force, that public confi-
dence is in fact low, or that threats to public safety and employee
efficiency are, in fact, substantial. 164 As a result, testing on the basis
161 See, e.g., Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 433; Transport Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp.
at 549; PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. at 790; Fraternal Order of Police v.
City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. at 475, 524 A.2d at 437; Caruso, 133 Misc. 2d at 551, 506
N.Y.S.2d at 795. In Caruso, the government claimed that its testing program was justi-
fied by a need to ascertain the extent of drug abuse within the workplace. This desire to
obtain admittedly useful information was deemed far from sufficient to justify
mandatory or random urinalysis. Id. at 551-52, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
162 See, e.g.,Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("significant and
compelling"); Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563, 1566 (6th Cit. 1988) ("compelling");
Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1544 (6th Cir. 1988) ("compelling");
Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 433("compelling"); PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp.
790 ("legitimate"); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516 (D.N.J. 1986)
('legitimate'); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1326 ("legitimate"); Fraternal
Order of Police v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. at 475-76, 524 A.2d at 437-38("im-
portant and legitimate"-applying Art. I. para. 7 of the NewJersey Constitution); Caruso,
133 Misc.2d at 552, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 795, 799. Cf Transport Workers v. SEPTA. 678 F.
Supp. at 549 ("paramount").
163 See supra note 135.
164 See, e.g., Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1547 (no evidence of fire department-wide drug
problem); Penny, 846 F.2d at 1567 (no evidence of significant police department-wide
drug problem); Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. at 433 (holding interest in public safety and secur-
ity insufficient to justify testing for off-duty drug use and integrity interest insufficient to
justify testing for on- or off-duty use because of lack of concrete evidence of relationship
between drug use and claimed harm); PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. at
791 (data regarding extent of drug use in society as a whole, insufficient to justify ran-
dom testing where there was no evidence of drug use among employees); Taylor v.
O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. at 1437-39 (random testing not justified where only one-tenth of
3% of work force are chronic abusers of illegal drugs and there is no evidence of a
public perception problem); Amalgamated Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency,
663 F. Supp. 1560, 1568 (C.D. Cal 1987) (no evidence of drug abuse problem among
employees); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 588-589 (N.D. Ohio 1987)
(citing lack of evidence that drugs are a problem among employees or that they cause
the specific harms the government was trying to avoid); Fraternal Order of Police v. City
of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. at 474, 524 A.2d at 437 (noting lack of evidence that drug
use among employees is extensive or that the public is presently endangered); Caruso,
133 Misc. 2d at 557, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (evidence showed drug abuse to be an occa-
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of individualized reasonable suspicion is deemed sufficient to ac-
complish the desired ends. 165 Urine testing without individualized
suspicion is overly intrusive on the already diminished rights of pub-
lic employees and constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure
under the fourth amendment.
There are a few exceptions to this trend. Cases upholding
sional problem at best); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educa-
tion, 119 A.D.2d at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891, 550 N.E.2d at 331 (1986)(no evidence of
drug abuse problem among employees). Cf Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d at 340
(mandatory drug tests included in routine employment-related medical examinations
reasonable at the inception in view of strong evidence of drug use among employees);
Transport Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. at 548-550 (random testing permissible as
possible deterrent where prior "suspicion testing" program did not prevent drug re-
lated accidents and there was evidence of loss of public confidence). But see AFGE v.
Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (mere notice of testing program may have
had deterrent effect resulting in lack of evidence of drug problem among employees).
There is some question whether random or mandatory testing conducted solely to bol-
ster public confidence would be sufficient to permit "highly intrusive" urinalysis even if
lack of confidence were documented. Cf Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. at 1439 (no
court has ever considered loss of public confidence sufficient in and of itself to justify
mandatory urinalysis) with Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986)
(where public confidence is essential to success of pervasively regulated horse racing
industry, state's "strong" interest outweighs minimal privacy interest of jockeys) cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 986 (1986).
Empirical or other objective evidence that the urinalysis program will accomplish
the desired ends may also be essential. See Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. at 1439;
AFGE v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 735-36.
165 Most of these courts reached this conclusion by determining that the individual
and government interests could best be accommodated by imposing an individualized
suspicion standard. See, e.g., RLEA v. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 588; PBA v. Washington
Township, 672 F. Supp. at 790; Carlucci, 690 F. Supp. at 433-34; Taylor v. O'Grady, 669
F. Supp. 1422, 1439 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. at 589;
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D.N.J. 1986); Fraternal Order of
Police v. City of Newark, 216 N.J. Super. at 475, 524 A.2d at 437; Patchogue-Medford
Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 119 A.D.2d at 40, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 891,
550 N.E.2d at 330. Thus, mandatory or random searches were unreasonable in their
inception. Several more recent decisions take a somewhat different approach. They
conclude that while it may be reasonable to conduct mandatory or random searches ab
initio, such searches are not reasonable in scope because there are less intrusive means of
accomplishing the government's objectives, usually amounting to training supervisors to
look for sufficient evidence of drug abuse to constitute reasonable suspicion. See, e.g.,
NFFE v. Carlucci, 690 F. Supp. 416, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F.
Supp. at 1438; Amalgamated Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp.
1560, 1568, 1569 (C.D. Cal. 1987). Cf. Caruso, 133 Misc.2d at 557, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
Other courts conclude that the scope of urine testing is not reasonably related to the
employer's goals. See, e.g., RLEA v. Burnley, 839 F.2d at 588-89 (9th Cir. 1988) (urinal-
ysis cannot detect degree of current impairment), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. RLEA, 109 S.
Ct. 1402 (1989);Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 340-341 (for drug testing of employees to
be reasonable, there must be a neus between the test and the employers legitimate
safety concern), cert. granted and judgement vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct.
1633 (1989); Carlucci, 690 F. Supp. at 434 (urinalysis not reasonably related to detecting
on-the-job impariment); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. at 1438 (urinalysis not reason-
ably related to detecting on the job impariment).
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mandatory or random public employee urinalysis fall into four
sometimes overlapping groups. The first category of cases hold that
urine testing of workers in highly regulated industries is permissible
in order to promote strong government interests in protecting the
public from danger, preventing corruption, or promoting public
confidence.' 66 Warrantless random or mandatory searches are per-
mitted in pervasively regulated industries based in part on the the-
ory that persons who choose to participate in such ventures, by
virtue of their knowledge of the statutes and regulations authorizing
administrative inspections of persons and places, enjoy substantially
reduced expectations of privacy with regard to such searches.t 67 In
166 See Washington Township, 850 F.2d at 144; Nebraska Public Power District v. Rush-
ton, 844 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1988); Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143; Transport Workers
v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. at 550. Cf. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
816 F.2d at 180 (drawing analogy to highly regulated industry), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1072, 1988; Mack v. United States, 653 F. Supp. 70, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(FBI agent had
diminished expectation of privacy given knowledge of FBI's strong interest in personal
lives of agents).
167 See Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142. Cf. Washington Township, 850 F.2d at 136 (police
officers' expectations of privacy to the point where a strong governmental interest out-
weighed them). While the wisdom of applying the highly regulated industry doctrine to
urine testing of jockeys was questionable in the first instance, Taylor, 669 F. Supp. at
1442 (implying that Shoemaker extended doctrine from prior applications only to
searches of premises to searches of persons), the Third Circuit's application of the doc-
trine in Washington Township is even more disturbing. Concluding that the government
interests in safety and police integrity were substantial and that police officers' expecta-
tions of privacy were lowered because they worked in a highly regulated industry, the
court held that Shoemaker was controlling and that mandatory and random testing with-
out individualized suspicion was permissible because the procedural and confidentiality
protections in the Washington Township plan were comparable to the plan upheld in
Shoemaker. Id. at 136, 141. This analysis satisfies only the first part of the requisite fourth
amendment inquiry-whether the search was justified at its inception. See supra note 89
and accompanying text. The court failed to properly evaluate whether the means of
conducting the search were reasonable because it erroneously.concluded that only the
methods of selecting employees for random searches and of insuring confidentiality
were relevant to that inquiry. The court failed to evaluate the nexus between the search
and the government's objectives and whether the search was more intrusive than neces-
sary. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text and infra notes- 159-60 and accom-
panying text. Although it may legitimately affect the outcome of the initial balancing
inquiry, the highly regulated industry detemination should not grant the government
carte blanche to perform any search regardless of the unreasonableness of its scope. Cf.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 863 F.2d at 1117 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he standard for
sustaining administrative searches does not represent an independent use of Fourth
Amendment analysis .... [A]dministrative searches are merely one illustration of the
reasonableness standard arising out of the 'careful balancing of governmental and pri-
vate interests.' "(citations omitted)). See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 60 at
§ 3.9(c), 190-92 (on the highly regulated industry standard doctrine).
Essentially the pervasively regulated industry theory is based on implied consent to
the search by virtue of voluntarily choosing to engage in a regulated indutry with knowl-
edge of the regulations. This may help to explain the analogy drawn by the Eighth
Circuit in Von Raab in which Customs Service employees seeking transfers to certain
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the second category are cases in which the courts hold that the em-
ployees' reasonable expectations of privacy are less than those of
other employees based on the fact that they were already subject to
equally or more intrusive employment related searches.1 68 The
third category includes cases in which the courts determined that
urine testing was only minimally intrusive because of the manner in
which it was performed. In some cases, the fact that urination was
unobserved and that other procedures were carefully delineated was
sufficient to earn this characterization. 169 Urine testing for evidence
of illegal drug abuse is also considered minimally intrusive when it is
positions were tested. Applicants were told that they would be tested at a certain time
and could withdraw their application without any adverse consequences. National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d at 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988). Accord Transportation Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp.
at 550; (analogizing employment setting to highly regulated industries); Rushton, 653 F.
Supp. at 1524-25 (same). Cf. NFFE v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(indicating that advance notice that mandatory urinalysis is required as a condition of
employment is relevant when assessing the extent of the employees' privacy interests).
Thus, the highly regulated industry standard exception should not apply when the regu-
lated scheme is not directed toward employees. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
863 F.2d at - (3d Cir. 1988); Burnley, 839 F.2d at 585. See also Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1545
(criticizing application of highly regulated industry doctrine in urinalysis cases).
168 See, e.g., Rushton, 844 F.2d at 566; McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th
Cir. 1987). In both cases, employees were also subjected to strip searches under certain
circumstances. Cf. AFGE v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. at 448 (indicating random urinalysis not
very intrusive where employees already subject to regularly scheduled urinalysis).
Urinalysis programs in the military have been upheld, in part, on the same theory. See
generally supra notes 112-120 and accompanying text. Cf. Washington Township, 850 F.2d
at 141 (referring to police as a quasi-military organization), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637
(1989).
A sub silentio factor in these cases may be an assessment that the government-and
public-interest in safety was more substantial than in other employment situations. For
example, the scope of threatened harm from prison riots, nuclear power plant accidents,
or air disasters far exceeds the harm feared by the government in other cases. Cf. Mack
v. United States, 653 F. Supp. at 75 (emphasizing vital national security interest in drug
free FBI); AFGE v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 735 (indicating that the balance may be
altered in favor of mandatory drug testing if the government were to substantiate its
claim that the employees' responsibilities regularly involved national security rather
than duties comparable to a local police officer). Further, the connection between sub-
stance abuse and public safety may be more intuitive and direct in these cases than in
others where stronger evidence that the feared harms are real is required. See Transport
Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. at 550 (analogizing McDonell and calling operating
employees positions "safety critical"). See also Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1546-47 (suggesting
that fourth amendment balancing should include consideration of potential harm to so-
ciety posed by drug-impaired employees and the extent to which drug tests will decrease
the risk of harm).
169 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177 (5th
Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988); AFGE v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445,448 (D.
D.C. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. at 1100-02 (D. NJ. 1985). Notably, in




included in mandatory, employment related, non-pretextual physi-
cal examinations.1 70 Because urine samples are generally taken dur-
ing physical exams, the courts reason that there is little additional
interest in protecting the specimen from analysis for drug
metabolites. 171
Unlike the first three groups of cases, the fourth category recog-
nizes that urinalysis constitutes a substantial interference with em-
ployee privacy rights. The one decision in this category cites
unusually strong evidence of the actual presence of a drug problem
in the employee population, a past record of actual drug-related
harm to the public, and failure of a prior individualized suspicion
testing program to alleviate the drug problem, to support its conclu-
sion that the government interest was predominant. Because the
testing program was reasonably related to affectuation of the partic-
ularly strong public safety interest, it did not violate the fourth
amendment. 172
e. Arrestees
Pre-bail urinalysis of arrestees is not directly analogous to any
of the contexts in which the courts have adjudicated the reasonable-
ness of urine testing as a non-criminal search. There are important
distinctions among the various contexts with regard to the extent of
fourth amendment interests possessed by the persons subject to
urine testing, 173 the government interest, 74 and the degree of def-
170 Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (routine annual examina-
tions), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub. nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989);
Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 733-34 (N.D. Il1. 1988) (return to work
examinations). But see Transport Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. at 551 (holding that
where random testing is permitted, return to work testing is unreasonable absent some
reasonable suspicion or programmatic basis).
171 See, e.g., Wrightsell v. City of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. at 734.
172 Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 863 F.2d at 1121 (3d Cir. 1988). Cf. Smith v.
City of East Point, 258 Ga. 111, 365 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1988)(citing evidence of actual
drug use by police and failure of efforts to solve problem by other means in addition to
relatively weak assessment of employee privacy interest to uphold mandatory testing).
173 As demonstrated above, arrestees cannot be required to undergo urinalysis solely
because of their status as arrestees. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text. Fur-
ther, arrestees enjoy more substantial fourth amendment rights than prisoners and
members of the military. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text and supra notes
116-117 and accompanying text. Because arrest, in and of itself, does not provide a
basis for diminishing an individual's fourth amendment protections, arrestees arguably
enjoy more extensive privacy rights than public employees. See infra notes 180-183 and
accompanying text for a discussion of arrestees' privacy interests vis-a-vis pre-bail test-
ing.
The ultimate use of the information obtained from urinalysis is another factor that
varies among contexts and that may subtly influence the outcome ofjudicial decisions.
Pre-bail urinalysis is distinguishable from most of the employment cases because it oc-
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erence to which the relevant government agency is entitled. 75
These cases do, however, provide guidance for an independent
analysis of the reasonableness of mandatory arrestee testing.
No court has ruled that a urinalysis program violates the fourth
amendment under any and all circumstances. On the other hand,
courts have approved mandatory and random urinalysis programs
only when the government interest in conducting the program is
very strong and when the court's assessment of the test subjects'
privacy interest is relatively weak. 176 Thus, in cases involving pris-
oners, the military, and employees such as prison guards, jockeys,
and nuclear power plant workers, urine testing programs have sur-
vived fourth amendment challenges even in the absence of evidence
that testing in fact accomplished the desired objectives.
Where the government interest, while still substantial, is not as
important, and when the court's assessment of the individual's pri-
vacy interest is high, the government's burden of proving that
mandatory or random testing does not violate the fourth amend-
ment is much more difficult. Thus, in cases involving public school
students and government employees such as police officers, fire
fighters, public transit employees, and school teachers, courts have
held that random or dragnet testing is impermissible in the absence
of a strong record revealing that drug use is a significant problem
177
and that the testing program is a reasonable means of ameliorating
the problem. 178 Under these circumstances, urinalysis is only per-
curs in the criminal justice context where the fruits of the urinalysis may be used in
criminal or other enforcement proceedings; specifically to revoke pretrial release, Berry
v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031, 1035 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and possibly as
evidence at trial. Jones v. United States, 833 F.2d 335, (D.D.C. 1988)(urinalysis results
may be used at trial for impeachment purposes). The school cases may be the most
analogous because they involve enforcement and/or criminal searches of a group that
retain some fourth amendment rights. The analogy is difficult, though, because the sub-
jects are minors and the consequences of many infractions of school rules-for example,
assignment to detention hall-are much less serious than the loss of liberty resulting
from revocation of pretrial release.
174 See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text for a discussion of the govern-
ment's interest in pre-bail testing.
175 This is especially important when evaluating the extent to which courts will re-
quire objective and, possibly, empirical proof that urinalysis serves the government's
purpose and the rigor with which they will critically examine the proffered evidence. See
infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
176 This is consistent with decisions approving other types of "dragnet" searches. See
supra note 97.
177 Mandatory testing designed to ascertain the extent of drug use in a population has
been disapproved. See, e.g., Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124, 1131-32 (W.D. Wisc.
1985); Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 551, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 795 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
178 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text. In contrast, where there is strong
evidence that drug abuse is a critical concern among the population to be tested, that it
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missible if there is reasonable individualized suspicion. 179
Given the current judicial climate, and the apparently inconsis-
tent, evolving standards for adjudicating the constitutional reasona-
bleness of non-criminal searches, it is difficult to ascertain exactly
what standard should be used to assess the reasonableness of pre-
bail stage urinalysis. The choice appears to be between traditional
balancing, illustrated by the cases involving prisoners, 180 and the
more recent method of weighing individual and government inter-
ests through the two step inquiry the Supreme Court has adopted
for school searches' 8 1 and workplace searches. 182 While the latter
apparently is the wave of the future, there is considerable confusion
about the proper analysis that occurs within each of the two steps
and the role balancing plays in the decision making process.' 83
The approach articulated by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Berry v. District of Columbia provides
does cause the harm sought to be avoided, and that urinalysis only on the basis of indi-
vidual suspicion will not solve the problem, mandatory and random programs have been
upheld. See, e.g., Transport Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. 543, 548-550 (D. Pa. 1988).
179 See supra note 136 and notes 162-165 and accompanying text. PBA v. Washington
Township, 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989), is the
only reported decision inconsistent with this trend. In that case, the Third Circuit held
that police officers in Washington Township, New Jersey, worked in a highly regulated
industry. Therefore, as in the cases discussed in the text accompanying supra note 152,
the government interest in testing was very strong and the police officer's privacy inter-
est was very low. Taking a narrow view of the issues in the case, the court decided that
under its prior decision in Shoemaker, random testing and mandatory testing during an
annual physical exam did not violate the fourth amendment. The court did not consider
whether drug use was in fact a problem among police officers in Washington Township
or whether there were alternate methods of accomplishing the government's goals of
assuring police integrity and safety.
As the Third Circuit noted in PBA v. Washington Township, courts are split on the
question of whether Shoemaker was correctly decided. Washington Township, 850 F.2d at
141 n.3. Moreover, Shoemaker has been distinguished or disregarded as an anomaly in
other cases involving random or mandatory urinalysis of police officers. See, e.g., Felici-
ano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 591 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Fraternal Order of
Police v. City of Newark, 500 A.2d at 434-35; Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. at 734-35; Caruso
v. Ward, 133 Misc.2d at 506, N.Y.S.2d at 798; Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp.
1507, 1518-19 (D.N.J. 1986). Whether the highly regulated industry doctrine was ever
meant to ease restrictions on searches of government employees in addition to the
premises and records of licensed commercial enterprises is subject to dispute. See Tay-
lor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1442, 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Fraternal Order of Police, 524
A.2d at 435. Nevertheless, the doctrine should not be construed to grant government
officials carte blanche to disregard employee privacy rights without demonstrating that
there is a real and significant drug problem and that the search and seizure is a reason-
able means of ameliorating the problem.
180 See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
181 See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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the best guidance.18 4 The issue of the constitutionality of post-ar-
raignment urinalysis, although not identical, is very similar to that of
pre-arraignment urine testing, and the circuit court's interpretation
of the two step approach is logical and does not suffer, at least ini-
tially, from being too heavily weighted on behalf of either the gov-
ernment or the individual. Berry indicated that to meet
constitutional standards, post-arraignment urinalysis must, first, be
reasonable at its inception. This determination requires balancing
of the government interest in conducting urine tests against the ar-
restees' privacy interest in not being required to submit their urine
for scrutiny. The inquiry includes consideration of what level of
suspicion, if any, may be necessary to make the intrusion on the in-
dividual's right of privacy reasonable. The second step, which is not
necessary unless the search is reasonable at its inception, involves
consideration of whether the search is reasonable in scope. This
inquiry involves exploration of whether the search is reasonably re-
lated to the government's objective and whether the manner of con-
ducting the search is reasonable.18 5 The former inquiry explores
the fit between means and ends; the latter investigates the proce-
dural aspects of the urinalysis program.
Analysis of the constitutionality of pre-arraignment urinalysis
begins with balancing. The first consideration is the degree of pri-
vacy arrestees enjoy in the act of urination. Most courts have con-
cluded that urine testing is highly intrusive, comparable to a strip
search or a body cavity search.18 6 Requiring an individual to urinate
on demand and to produce urine for scientific examination is de-
grading and humiliating. Urinalysis can expose confidential medical
information to which the government has no right, in addition to
evidence of drug ingestion.' 8 7 If observation is required, as is gen-
erally necessary to meet chain of custody concerns, the already
grave privacy implications become even more serious. 8 8 Privacy
rights are infringed still more if the act of urination is observed by
184 The court adopted this standard directly from employee urinalysis cases it had
decided since O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d
1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing NFFE v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935, 942-43) (D.C.
Cir. 1987). Accord Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
185 Berry, 833 F.2d at 1034-36 (describing approach to be taken by district court on
remand). Accord Weinberger, 818 F.2d at 942-43;Jones, 833 F.2d at 338-40.
186 See supra notes 93 and 149-154 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
188 See Jones, 833 F.2d at 340 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observation raises different privacy
concerns), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633
(1989); PBA v. Washington Township, 672 F. Supp. 779, 787 (D.NJ. 1987) (the taking




Even though, in the abstract, urinalysis is highly intrusive and
the privacy interests apparently substantial, the privacy interests will
be diminished if, by virtue of their status, the test subjects cannot
reasonably expect the same degree of privacy as ordinary citizens.
Unlike prisoners, members of the military, public school students,
and even public employees, there is no basis for concluding that the
overall privacy rights enjoyed by arrestees are diminished solely by
virtue of their status. 190 Even if it is assumed that arrestees' rights
are not equivalent to those of ordinary citizens, their rights are more
analogous to public school students and public employees, who re-
tain some rights, than to prisoners and the military, who lose almost
all their fourth amendment rights. Unlike convicted prisoners, ar-
restees have not yet been convicted of a crime. The overwhelming
interests in institutional and national security that play a strong role
in the assessment of the strength of the constitutional rights of pris-
189 See Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(unreasonable to
collect urine samples in a place where unnecessary persons can observe). In the District
of Columbia, pre-bail urine samples must be produced from a position in the lock up
from which the pretrial services officer, and other detainees, can observe the urination.
Brief of the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia as Amicus Curiae, at
12, Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Commonly, toilet facilities in lock-up cells are subject to observation. The fact that
all urination is subject to view, however, does not eradicate the privacy rights implicated
by urinalysis. "That an individual may voluntarily engage in an activity cannot be the
basis of granting to the government the power to compel an individual to engage in that
activity." Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 539, 544 (6th Cir. 1986). An analo-
gous argument, that use of public restrooms takes away one's privacy interest in this
regard, has been rejected. As one Court of Appeals that ultimately approved employee
testing stated, "expectations of privacy in a particular activity do not exist on an all or
nothing basis ... even the individual who willingly urinates in the presence of another
does not 'reasonably expect to discharge urine under circumstances making... discov-
ery of the personal physiological secrets it holds' possible." National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) (footnotes omitted). Accord
Lovvorn, 846 F.2d at 1544.
190 Although arrestees, unlike ordinary citizens, may be subjected to quite intrusive
booking searches and to warrantless searches incident to arrest, those searches are per-
mitted because of the overwhelming importance of the government's interest in con-
ducting them when balanced against the ordinary interest in bodily privacy rights. The
fact that an individual's rights may be invaded for one purpose does not automatically
permit an additional invasion of privacy rights for a separate purpose. Thus, in Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987), the Court held that an intrusion into an arrestee's
home justified by exigent circumstances cannot be extended to allow officers to search
portions of the home or objects unrelated to the objectives of the original search.
Urinalysis involves an additional invasion of privacy of arrestees because it is not justi-
fied by either exigent circumstances or the compelling interests that make searches inci-
dent to arrest and booking searches constitutionally reasnable. See supra notes 83-94 and
accompanying text. Therefore, as in Hicks, pre-bail urinalysis must be authorized
independently.
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oners and the military are not present in the context of bail stage
urinalysis. 191
Finally, none of the considerations beyond mere status that
have led some courts to hold urinalysis only minimally intrusive ap-
ply to pre-bail testing. 192 Bail stage urinalysis is observed; it is not
collateral to a non-pretextual medical examination; and there is no
basis for concluding that test subjects implicitly consent to intensi-
fied scrutiny of their private lives by virtue of their arrest. 93 There
is no escaping the conclusion that pre-bail urinalysis implicates pri-
vacy rights that are far from minimal; in fact, it is highly intrusive.
On the other side of the balance must be weighed the govern-
ment interest in performing pre-bail urine tests and using the re-
sults to inform the pretrial release decision. Although until recently
the sole acknowledged objective of the bail or pretrial release deci-
sion was to insure that criminal defendants will appear for trial, 194 in
United States v. Salerno, the Court legitimized the hitherto sub rosa
goal of protecting the community from dangerous defendants. 195
Conditioning pretrial release to address public safety concerns does
not violate the Constitution,196 and authority to impose appropriate
conditions on release has been incorporated into the laws of many
states, the District of Columbia and the federal jurisdiction.
197
The government claims that the information revealed by urine
testing is useful to pretrial release decisionmakers because it serves
both purposes of bail: to ensure the efficient operation of the crimi-
nal justice system and to preserve public safety. It is believed by
proponents of drug testing programs at the bail stage-and prelimi-
nary research has reported findings-that drug users are more likely
to abscond and/or be rearrested for new crimes if released pretrial
than non-drug users. 198 Thus, it is reasoned that requiring further
191 See supra note 103. The analysis here is directed to a preliminary assessment of the
strength of the subject population's personal privacy rights in general, which is neces-
sary before a more direct comparison between the actual privacy interest involved (uri-
nation and analysis of urine specimens) and the government interest in the specific
search and seizure can be made. The relative strength of the government's interest in
bail stage urinalysis is assessed below. See infra notes 194-199 and accomanying notes.
192 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
193 The analogy here is to the reasoning in cases involving highly regulated industries
and analogous cases where employees were forewarned that they would be subject to
other types of highly intrusive searches if they accepted the employment. See supra notes
169-191 and accompanying text.
194 See Goldkamp, Danger and Detention, supra note 17, at 1-14.
195 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
196 Id.
197 For a general discussion of these laws see Goldkamp, Danger and Detention, supra
note 17.
198 See supra notes 7 and 10 and accompanying text.
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testing and/or treatment as a condition of release helps individuals
to become drug free, decreases the likelihood of non-appearance,
protects the community from the risk that released defendants will
commit further crimes, and provides the court with a reliable indica-
tion of which releases are unwilling or unable to comply with the
conditions imposed on their pretrial liberty.199 Indeed, the govern-
ment argues that because drug abuse is apparently a feature of crim-
inality, requiring users to stay free of drugs as a condition of pretrial
release will decrease the overall incidence of crime.
200
The government's purposes for performing pre-arraignment
urine testing appear, at least superficially, reasonably related to its
legitimate and important interests in public safety and efficient op-
eration of the criminal justice system. These interests, however, do
not rise to the level of the national security concerns or risk of cata-
strophic accidents involving mass transit, nuclear reactors, and nu-
clear or chemical weapons invoked in a number of cases in which the
courts have upheld mandatory or random urinalysis under the
fourth amendment.20 ' Rather, the government interest in pre-bail
urinalysis is analogous to the still significant, but less catastrophic
concerns of public safety and efficient operation of the work place
articulated in most of the public employee cases 202 and in the public
school cases. 20 3 Principles established in those cases reveal that the
relative strength of the government's claims, when measured
against the more than minimal individual rights implicated by
mandatory or random drug testing, is substantially affected by the
ability of the government to prove empirically that positive urinal-
ysis results are reasonably related to its articulated goals. 20 4 In con-
trast to the prison cases in which the courts usually defer to agency
expertise, the courts are unlikely to accept the claim that pre-bail
stage testing is a reasonable means of assuring public safety or court
appearances without relatively close judicial scrutiny because pre-
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See, e.g., supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text. Cases approving mandatory
or random testing where the government interest was not as high, for the most part,
have relied on some variety of implied consent or a notice theory to diminish the privacy
interest. There is no basis for a comparable finding of implied consent or notice in the
case ofarrestees merely because they have been arrested. See supra note 190 and accom-
panying text. But see infra notes 228-244 and accompanying text suggesting how poten-
tial fourth amendment difficulties with mandatory pre-bail urinalysis may be avoided by
obtaining express consent.
202 See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 121-131 and accompanying text.
204 Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F. 2d 1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See supra
notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
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trial release decisionmaking is an area well within the expertise of
the judiciary. 20 5 Therefore, empirical support for the proposition
that positive urinalysis results are reasonably related to incidence of
crime in the pretrial period and non-appearance for court dates is
likely to be required to prove that the government objectives. 20 6
Preliminary research provides empirical evidence tending to
show a connection between positive results in bail stage urine test-
ing and performance on pretrial release. 20 7 Thus, preliminary anal-
ysis, at least, leads to the conclusion that the government interest in
public safety and efficient operation of the criminal justice system
outweighs the individual privacy interests implicated by urinalysis.
But there is an additional consideration that must be addressed in
order to determine whether bail stage urinalysis is justified at its in-
ception-whether there is sufficient evidence to show that the gov-
ernment interest is compelling enough to justify mandatory testing
of all arrestees. 208 In Berry, the circuit court strongly implied that
unless post-arraignment testing is limited to those arrestees for
whom there is some individualized basis for suspecting drug use, it
does not meet the strictures of the fourth amendment.20 9 The court
was evidently concerned that the government interest, while
weighty, was not sufficiently related to mandatory testing to over-
205 This is in contrast to the lack of scrutiny in cases involving prisoners due to the
substantial deference courts accord prison administrators' decisions. See supra notes
109-110 and accompanying text.
206 Berry, 833 F.2d at 1035; NFFE v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416, 433 n.15 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
207 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
The Berry court indicated one potential difficulty with the current research showing
a positive correlation between drug abuse and crime, noting that not all crime directly
poses a threat to community safety. In such cases, imposing conditions upon pretrial
release and revoking release for failure to comply with those conditions may be prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, in some jurisdictions specific statutory authorization may
be required. Often, as in the case of the District of Columbia, the authorization is lim-
ited to concern for the "safety of . . . the community." D.C. Code Ann. § 23-
1321(a)(1981). More significantly, in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the
Court upheld pretrial detention against a claim that it unjustifiably intruded upon an
arrestee's liberty interests on the theory that concern for community safety outweighed
the individual interests. It could be argued that imposing conditions on pretrial release
unrelated to community safety violates constitutionally protected liberty interests. See
Berry, 833 F.2d at 1035 n.208
208 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. But see AFGE v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445,
447-48 (D.D.C. 1987) (erroneously placing burden of proof on persons challenging
urinalysis program).
209 The court of appeals explicitly directed the district court to "determine whether
there is a reasonable basis for the apparent assumption that arrestees ordered into the
testing program are potential drug users." Berry v. District of Columbia, 533 F.2d
1031, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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come the substantial privacy interests at stake.210 The same conclu-
sion is likely here.
There are exceptions to the general trend requiring individual-
ized suspicion when mandatory testing is pursued to protect public
safety, including cases in which there is evidence of a considerable
drug culture among the populations subject to urinalysis. 211 These
courts are willing to accept the argument that mandatory or random
testing will deter, and therefore diminish, the drug problem in the
population.21 2 Researchers examining drug use among recently ar-
rested persons report that large proportions of arrestees test posi-
tively for drugs of abuse, thus indicating a large drug subculture
among the population subject to bail stage testing.2 13 This evi-
dence, however, is not likely to be sufficient to alleviate the qualms
expressed by the Berry court. First, evidence of widespread drug
abuse was not the only factor affecting the balancing equation in
those cases; the courts also found, for various reasons not present in
bail stage testing, that the intrusion on individual privacy interests
was minimal.2
14
Second, although pre-arraignment testing may ultimately lead
to deterence of drug abuse, the means by which this may occur are
not analogous to the deterrence argument in other contexts. One
of the purposes of bail stage testing is to determine which defend-
ants granted pre-trial release should be ordered into a program of
periodic urine testing to deter drug use during the pretrial period.
This goal, however, differs from promotion of pre-arrest abstinence
210 Id. at 1035-36. The court did not question the importance of the government's
claimed goals. However, the court did not "that exceptions to the requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests impli-
cated by a search are minimal." Id. at 1036. In an earlier footnote, the court indicated
that post-arrainment urine testing involved a "significant intrusion" on an individual's
right of privacy. Id. at 1035 n.17.
211 See, e.g., Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted and
judgement vacated sub nom. Jenkins v.Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989); Transport Workers v.
SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. 543, 548-550 (D. Pa. 1988).
212 See supra notes 110, 118, and 161 and accompanying text (referring to prison
cases, military cases, and employment cases where deterrence is cited as one reason why
testing is permissible). See also Hampson v. Satran, 319 N.W.2d 796, 800 n.3 (W.D.
1982).
213 See sources cited supra note 4.
214 See, e.g., PBA v. Washington Township, 850 F.2d 133, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (police
officer has "diminished lowered expectations of privacy" where police industry is "most
highly regulated" in New Jersey), cert. denied, 109 S.C. 1637 (1989); Jones v. McKenzie,
833 F.2d at 340 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (privacy interest minimal where urine tests included in
non-pretextual annual physical examination), cert. granted and judgement vacated sub nom.
Jenkins v. Jones, 109 S. Ct. 1633 (1989); Transport Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp.
543, 548-550 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (privacy interest minimized where public transit analo-
gized to highly regulated industry).
[Vol. 80
DRUG TESTING AT BAIL STAGE
due to knowledge that testing might occur after arrest and does not
logically support mass testing of all arrestees.
Finally, it may be argued that the high prevalence rate of drug
use among arrestees provides a sufficient factual basis to suspect
that all arrestees' tests might be positive. The mere fact that an indi-
vidual belongs to a suspect group, however, is not sufficient, in and
of itself, to permit any intrusion upon that individual's fourth
amendment rights.2 15 Thus, despite the documented finding that a
large number of arrestees will test positively for drug use, it is un-
likely that courts would find mandatory or random testing at the
pre-bail stage warranted and more likely that they would conclude
that government and individual interests could best be accommo-
dated by limiting testing to those arrestees for whom there is some
reasonable individualized basis for suspecting drug abuse.2 1
6
Even if a court did hold mandatory pre-bail urinalysis reason-
able at its inception, its scope must also be reasonable to meet
fourth amendment requirements. Similarly, the Constitution re-
quires that the scope of testing based upon individualized suspicion
also be reasonable. Determination of the reasonableness of the
scope of a search involves consideration of the nexus between the
search and the government's objectives and of whether the proce-
dure is more intrusive than necessary to accomplish these goals ef-
fectively.21 7 Using this yardstick, proponents of mandatory testing
will encounter a number of potential criticisms. For example, pre-
215 See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 55 (1979). But cf Morris & Miller, supra note
37 (arguing that attributes placing defendants in a high-risk classification justify treating
them like high-risk defendants for purposes of pretrial release).
216 See Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1987). While the
definitions of the specific standard of individualized suspicion differ, seesupra note 110, a
likely standard to apply to bail stage testing would be a reasonable basis to believe,
supported by objective articulable facts, that urinalysis would show evidence of drug
use. As a practical matter, this standard would require a showing of some basis for
suspecting that the test subject was a drug user. A mere "hunch" or "feeling" does not
meet this standard; nor does a claim that drug use was simply suspected because the
individual was involved in criminal activity (unless, perhaps, the arrest was for a drug-
related crime).
As a practical matter, limiting pre-bail urinalysis to arrestees for whom there is indi-
vidualized suspicion may result in many drug users escaping detection, thus defeating
the purposes of the urine testing program. See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae
at 16, Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This, however,
does not alter the analysis. The fact that the only way to obtain useful information is
through a constitutionally unreasonable search has never been sufficient to make the
search constitutional. Accord AFGE v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 735 (S.D. Ga.
1988); NFFE v. Carlucci, 680 F. Supp. 416, 433 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Feliciano v. City
of Cleveland, 671 F. Supp. 578, 586 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
217 See supra note 160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fourth amend-
ment standard described in Berry.
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bail testing of all arrestees may be excessive. There is no purpose in
testing those arrestees who ultimately are discharged at their first
appearance because the judge finds no probable cause or those de-
fendants who are not charged with bailable offenses. Still other ar-
restees will admit they are drug users to pretrial services officers
during the informational interview; others may have been discov-
ered to be in possession of drugs at the time of their arrest or dis-
play observable evidence of intravenous drug use or exhibit
behavior characteristic of either intoxication or withdrawal; some
may have prior records that reveal them to be users of controlled
substances. Once again, mandatory drug testing to establish recent
drug use seems extraneous when applied to these categories of
individuals.21
8
Another difficulty may lie in the limitations of the testing proce-
dure itself.21 9 Although the various testing technologies are re-
markably accurate, especially when compared with earlier
technologies, 220 a certain number of false positive results (results
designating a person as a user of drugs who is not a user of drugs)
are nevertheless generated. In other settings when positive results
from screening tests are submitted to confirmatory testing-such as
gas chromatography/mass spectometry-false positives are mostly
corrected before the information may be used to influence impor-
tant decisions. Because time and cost constraints prohibit routine
use of confirmatory techniques in the pre-bail application of drug
testing, the problem presented by the potential for false positives
(as well as false negatives) will be more significant. One recent
study reports between eleven and thirteen percent false positives
generated from a sample of tested defendants. 221 Of course, even
true positive results are open to problems of interpretation; for ex-
ample, they may reveal only an isolated incident of drug use rather
than habitual abuse and thus make a defendant inappropriately eli-
218 Given the government's minimal standard of proof at bail hearings, any of these
circumstances may be sufficient to condition release upon abstinence from substance
abuse. See supra notes 120-131 and accompanying text (suggesting that urinalysis is
more intrusive than necessary when there is already sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause that the test subject was using drugs).
219 See generally supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
220 See Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 45 (discussing accuracy and sensitivity
of testing technologies); Blanke, supra note 46.
221 See Goldkamp, Gottfredson, & Weiland, supra note 10, at 30. Despite these con-
cerns, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently held that a single, uncon-
firmed EMIT test constitutes reliable, competent evidence of intoxication in that
jurisdiction. See Jones v. United States, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The concerns
articulated in the text are equally relevant to the weight and creditibility to be ascribed
to the evidence as to its admissiblity in the first instance.
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gible for more restrictive conditions of pretrial release. Moreover,
despite the rationale underlying testing that suggests a relationship
between drug use and crime, drug testing may show correctly that a
defendant abuses illegal drugs, but it does not show whether use of
the drug in question is somehow connected with the defendant's al-
leged criminal activity or is merely coincidental. 222 To the extent
that pre-bail testing plays a role in helping pretrial service employ-
ees to determine, prior to actual non-appearance or re-arrest, which
releases are unlikely to comply with court-imposed conditions of re-
lease, a simple reporting condition that would not implicate any spe-
cifically protected constitutional rights is only one of the many
possible alternative methods of accomplishing the same goal.
These limitations surrounding the inferences that can be drawn
from drug test results argue in favor of using other means of identi-
fying drug abusers that do not infringe upon constitutionally pro-
tected rights. 22
3
Finally, the actual procedures used for collecting the samples
must be examined to determine whether they are no more intrusive
than is reasonable given the circumstances that justify testing in the
first instance. It is generally accepted that urine samples must be
given under observation in order to assure the chain of custody and
to thwart falsification of results. 224 However, observation by one
person of the same sex in as discrete a manner as possible is all that
is required.
Another consideration is whether and when test subjects are
given an opportunity to explain positive results. Subjects should, at
the least, be given an opportunity to challenge the evidence at the
release hearing; questions about use of legal prescription and non-
prescription drugs and other facts that may cause a false positive
result should come before the test is performed. Scrupulous proce-
dures must be developed and followed to maintain the confidential-
ity of the information obtained in response to pre-test questioning
and in test results. In the criminal justice context there are two as-
222 The usefulness of drug testing as a classification instrument at the pre-bail stage is
not dependent upon its ability to show that the subject was under the influence of drugs
at the time the criminal conduct occurred. Nonetheless, to the extent that the reason for
classifying arrestees as drug users is based upon the belief that there is a relationship
between drug use and crime, the inability of the current technology to demonstrate
more than a coincidental connection between ingestion of a controlled substance and
alleged criminal activity is troublesome.
223 See supra text accompanying note 125 for some possible alternatives. The sugges-
tions there are not intended to be exhaustive.
224 It is important to scrupulously maintain chain of custody procedures throughout
the testing and reporting process in order to assure the admissibility of the evidence at
the pretrial release hearing.
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pects to this requirement. On one level, the information must be
limited to the purpose for which it was obtained-informing the
pretrial release decision. Positive test results cannot be used as evi-
dence at trial, in sentencing, or in probation or parole violation pro-
ceedings. 225 Confidentiality requirements, however, go further.
Drug use information should only be disseminated on a "need to
know" basis. In the typical case the only people who "need to
know" are the pretrial services officer, the judicial officer, the prose-
cutor, and the defense attorney involved in the pretrial release hear-
ing. The fourth amendment requires that when, as here, substantial
privacy interests are involved, procedures must be designed to up-
hold individual dignity as much as possible, whether mandatory
urinalysis is reasonable or testing is limited to arrestees for whom
individualized suspicion of use of controlled substances can be
established.
226
It is difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of either the Berry
case or other litigation involving pre-bail stage testing that is sure to
follow. Both the legal and social science research questions in-
volved are complex and research and analysis in both disciplines is
relatively recent and incomplete. Berry and other non-criminal
urinalysis cases demonstrate that testing programs that are carefully
tailored to respect the privacy rights of arrestees to the greatest ex-
tent possible and to recognize the limitations of urinalysis as a pre-
dictive tool are most likely to survive fourth amendment challenge.
Mandatory drug testing of all entering criminal defendants does not
appear to meet these criteria. Moreover, even testing limited to
those defendants for whom there is individualized suspicion of drug
abuse may be problematic if it is not carefully limited in scope to
persons for whom the information obtained is useful for the pretrial
release decision or if testing procedures are more intrusive than is
reasonably necessary.
225 This restriction is not being followed in the District of Columbia. In Jones, supra
note 221, the court held that evidence of a positive pre-bail urine test was admissible at
trial to rebut defendant's claim that he did not know a substance he found on the street
was cocaine. Accord D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1303(d) (1981 & Supp. 1988). Use ofpre-bail
urine test results at trial significantly alters the analysis of whether the tests are reason-
able under the fourth amendment. The possibility that the evidence will be used at trial
to convict a defendant of a crime rather than be limited to imposing additional condi-
tions on pretrial release significantly increases the arrestees' interests in being free from
dragnet testing and makes procedural due process concerns more significant. Notably,
these concerns were not raised in Jones; the only constitutional issue presented to the
court involved the sixth amendment's confrontation clause. Jones, 833 F.2d 335.
226 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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3. Consent Searches
If this Article has correctly analyzed the impediments to system-
atic urine testing of arrestees as a non-criminal search, drug testing
at the pre-bail stage may be limited to individuals for whom there is
reasonable individualized suspicion of recent drug use, based on ob-
jective, articulable facts. Thus, for all practical purposes, adoption
of mass urine testing programs seem nearly impossible. Many of
these objections, of course, could be overcome if arrestees con-
sented to provide urine samples, because an otherwise reasonable
search may be conducted without individualized suspicion or a war-
rant pursuant to the fourth amendment so long as valid consent is
obtained. In all likelihood, constitutionally valid consent to bail
stage urinalysis can be obtained in the vast majority of cases. Re-
view of the legal requirements for consent, however, helps to illus-
trate some of the pitfalls that may nevertheless be encountered.
First, to be valid, consent must be given voluntarily by the per-
son upon whose right of privacy the search intrudes. 227 The gov-
ernment must prove voluntariness, which is determined based on
the totality of the circumstances. 228 The court will assess both the
characteristics of the alleged consenter and the circumstances under
which the government agents obtained the alleged consent. Among
the circumstances that must be considered in determining if consent
is voluntary are traits of the individual such as maturity, level of edu-
cation, emotional state, physical health, and whether the individual
was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time the consent
was obtained.229 It is not necessary to prove that the consenter was
aware of his or her right to withhold consent, although such evi-
dence substantially eases the government's burden.23 0 The highly
individualized nature of the consent inquiry, dependent as it is on
the specific characteristics of the individual whose consent is sought,
is particularly problematic in the context of a mandatory testing pro-
gram in which every arrestee is asked to provide a urine sample,
regardless of the arrestee's intellect, physical and emotional health,
or possible state of intoxication. Significant numbers of arrestees
suffer from one or more infirmities that would call the validity of
their consent into question. 23 1 The difficulty of insuring that con-
227 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
228 Id.
229 LaFave & Israel, supra note 60, at 204.
230 See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 1987); Feliciano v. City
of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 593-94 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F.
Supp. 1134, 1147 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
231 As a practical matter, it may be difficult for test subjects to obtain any remedy for
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sent of large numbers of arrestees is voluntary poses a significant
obstacle to successful implementation of mass pre-bail urinalysis
programs.
Examination of the characteristics of the individual who is the
subject of the search and seizure is not the end of the consent in-
quiry. Other circumstances relevant to the voluntariness determina-
tion are more susceptible to control by program administrators.
The environment and the means by which consent was obtained are
both crucial to the inquiry. Consent given pursuant to express or
implied threats, coercion, or claim of right to search, of course, will
not be viewed as voluntary. 232 Consent obtained as a condition of
exercising a separate benefit, privilege, or right is constitutionally
inadequate to validate a search. 233 Although there is no absolute
constitutional right to bail or pretrial release,234 there are in the
laws of many jurisdictions in the United States presumptions for
both release on personal recognizance and release under the least
restrictive conditions 235 -in short, tantamount to defining at least
an important privilege, pretrial liberty of the accused, that should
not be conditioned upon agreement to submit to a constitutionally
unreasonable search.
2 36
The jail or other custody environment in which the request for
consent is made obviously plays a role in determining the validity of
that consent. Certainly, a person can give valid consent for a fourth
amendment search while in custody awaiting a first appearance.
However, because of the coercive nature of the environment, other
aspects of consent, such as the individual characteristics and the
specific means used to obtain the consent, are likely to be scruti-
nized more carefully. 237 The identity and numbers of the officials
an invalid consent because in most jurisdictions the exclusionary rule does not apply to
bail or bail revocation hearings. See generally Goldkamp, Danger and Detention, supra note
17 at 74 (table summarizing due process features of American bail laws including
whether application of the same rules of evidence as at trial). Nonetheless, civil actions
for either damages or injunctions are possible. Further, the absence of a remedy does
not justify deprivation of fourth amendment rights. See supra note 49.
232 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 60, at § 3.10(1), 204-06. See also United States v. Men-
denhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-59 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-26
(1973); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 593-94 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
233 See, e.g., Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 593; Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 249
(N.D.Ga. 1986); Wheaton, 435 F. Supp. at 1147; Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14-15
(N.D. Ala. 1978). See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 60 at § 3.10, 206; Caruso v.
Ward, 133 Misc. 2d at 548-50, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 793-94 (Sup. Ct. 1986) aff'd, 131 A.D. 2d
214, 520 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1987) (collecting cases).
234 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
235 See Goldkamp,Danger and Detention, supra note 14, at 10-14.
236 See supra note 203.
237 Cf LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 60, at § 3.10, 206.
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requesting the consent, for example, may be significant. 23 8 Argua-
bly, a request by pretrial services employees is not as inherently co-
ercive as one by police officers or by guards in the lock-up.
23 9
While lack of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not
conclusive, such knowledge can counteract other coercive circum-
stances.240 Given the inherently coercive environment in which bail
stage urinalysis is necessarily performed, probably the most efficient
method of avoiding challenges to the validity of any particular indi-
vidual's consent at later stages is adoption of an "informed consent"
procedure. A pre-printed form would detail what the urine sample
would and would not be used for and what the test can and cannot
reveal, would explain the possible consequences of a positive test
result, and would specify that consent need not be given in order to
obtain pretrial release. 24 1 The arrestee would be asked to sign a
statement on the form indicating that he or she had read the form,
understood it, and gave consent.
No matter how well drafted, the use of an informed consent
procedure is not foolproof because examination of the circum-
stances may disclose that it was not signed voluntarily. For exam-
ple, signing a consent form under an express or implied threat of
punitive measures or loss of opportunity to obtain pretrial release
may invalidate the consent.242 Likewise, a form signed by an indi-
vidual who is incapable of giving voluntary consent due to personal
238 See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558-59 (threats perceived by accused because of social
discrepancies are relevant); Feliciano, 661 F. Supp. at 595 (noting that police academy
instructors, who were usually unarmed, wore arms on day urine was tested); Wheaton v.
Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1147 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (patrons were searched by armed
police officers).
239 Procedures for requesting consent must be carefully delineated because express
or implied threats, coercion, or claims of right must be avoided. Program developers
should avoid use of procedures that falsely imply that urinalysis is permissible regardless
of whether consent is obtained or that pretrial release is contingent upon submitting to
urinalysis. See Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 39 (W.D. Ark. 1985); AFGE v. Wein-
berger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 736 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245,
249 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Whea-
ton, 435 F. Supp. at 1146-48. Critics have argued that jurisdictions that will not release
the defendant before trial until the judge has seen urinalysis results, even though pre-
bail testing is "voluntary," may be undermining the validity of the testing program be-
cause the consent may be given due to knowledge that pre-trial release is contingent
upon promise of a urine sample.
240 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558-59; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49;
Felidano, 661 F. Supp. at 594.
241 The form should be written in the simplest language possible and should be read
aloud to test subjects in addition to giving individuals time to study it themselves. Span-
ish language forms may also be desirable in many jurisdictions. The District of Colum-
bia program employs a version of such a consent form. SeeJ. CARvER, supra note 6.
242 Cf. City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324-25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985)(consent invalid where signatures procured under threat of disciplinary action).
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characteristics is not valid. 243 Nonetheless, use of a well drafted
consent form that includes strictly adhered to guarantees that fail-
ure to cooperate will in no way penalize an individual is probably




As concerns for public safety at the pretrial release stage of the
criminal process have emerged from the realm of public contro-
versy, judicial discretion and sub rosa preventive detention to a level
of explicit, constitutional recognition, the advent of drug testing at
the entry stages has been embraced by its proponents as a valuable
informational tool as well as an effective means for controlling crime
among released defendants. The pretrial release decision has long
suffered from vague and controversial goals, few release alternatives
and poor or irrelevant information upon which to base decisions.
Given this history, proponents argue that drug testing technology
brought to bear on bail decisionmaking offers more accurate and
objective information and thus, ideally, more effective decisionmak-
ing by the courts at the bail/pretrial release stage.
This promise, however, is based on two critical assumptions:
first, that the information provided by the new technology is perti-
nent to the demands of the predictive bail decision task; and, sec-
ond, that mass drug testing of all arrestees is constitutionally
permissible. The relevance of the information to the performance
of the pretrial release decision task-the utility of drug test results in
discerning the risk of defendant flight and crime during pretrial re-
lease-can best be determined by empirical research, research that
is in comparatively early stages. If drug testing does not serve as a
good predictor of defendant behavior during pretrial release, or if
drug use and criminality are not related in the direct way assumed,
then programs of detecting current defendant drug use and pro-
grams monitoring defendant drug abuse during provisional pretrial
liberty will not ultimately improve the effectiveness of the courts'
pretrial release function.
243 See supra notes 127-231 and accompanying text.
244 See Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 1987), holding plaintiff's
consent valid where he signed a form that included the following statement:
I have been advised that I am under no obligation to provide a urine sample in
connection with this administrative inquiry and I have further been advised that any
information I supply would not be used against me in any criminal proceeding.
Therefore I voluntarily submit to providing a urine specimen.
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This Article has examined the constitutional implications of
drug testing at the pre-bail stage. That drug testing constitutes a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment is clear. The
constitutionality of such a search hinges principally on the notions
of reasonableness and voluntariness. Quite obviously, if systematic
testing of all arrestees violates fourth amendment prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures-even assuming power-
ful empirical findings to buttress the operating assumptions-cur-
rent plans for expanded drug testing at this stage in the criminal
process will have to be reconsidered and existing programs will re-
quire modification to conform to fourth amendment requirements.
Program revisions may range from relatively simple alterations in
testing procedure to ensure the search and seizure is conducted in a
reasonable manner to more radical changes in the definition of the
population tested. For example, it may be necessary to limit testing
to persons arrested for bailable offenses. Similarly, it is quite likely
that nonconsensual testing prior to the bail decision must be limited
to persons for whom individualized suspicion can be established.
Existing programs operate under the notion that potential
fourth and fifth amendment difficulties can be cured by obtaining
voluntary compliance. Theoretically, defendants can consent to
drug testing. However, the voluntariness of that consent depends
on problems that may not be totally corrected by the use of a con-
sent form. The personal attributes of the defendants, the coercive
nature of the custody environment, and the informal lore about how
judges in a particular jurisdiction will react to defendants at the bail
stage who have declined to consent to urine testing, all may be
viewed as invalidating the consent and falsifying the notion that the
testing programs are based on voluntary defendant participation.
The government would like to employ the technology to screen
as broad a spectrum of criminal defendants entering the system as
possible to use the collected information effectively for the pretrial
release decision. Obviously, if assumptions about the drug-crime
relationship are borne out empirically, restriction of pre-bail drug
testing to only those who give valid fourth amendment consent or to
those for whom there is individualized suspicion will seriously
weaken the utility of the technology. By allowing a potentially large
number of defendants with drug abuse habits to refuse testing, a
great many of the "target" defendants will be able to avoid classifi-
cation based on drug use information. Similarly, pre-bail testing
will be duplicative and unnecessary once sufficient evidence of drug
us6 to show individualized suspicion has been mustered; the same
information standing alone provides an adequate basis for ordering
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conditional pretrial release. 245 In this event, the empirical bene-
fits-if they ever existed-may be so diminished by the constitu-
tional limitations, that jurisdictions might be forced to ask how the
effectiveness of pretrial release practices could be improved in other
ways not involving the expense and complexity of drug testing
programs.
245 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
176 [Vol. 80
